Cultural Leaders of India

551

FOUNDERS OF PHILOSOPHY

Kapila● Patañjali●
Kaṇāda● Gautama●
Jaimini● Bādarāyaṇa●

PUBLICA DIVISION
MINISTRY OF INFOR AND BROADCASTING
GOVER some INDIA

November 1975 (Kartika 1897)

©

Printed in India

Price : Rs.

Published by the Director Publications Division Ministry of Information and Broadcasting Government of India Patiala House New Delhi-110001

Sales Emporia ● Publications Divisi

Super Bazar Connaught Circus N hi-110001
Botawala Chambers Sir Phero ehta Road Bombay-400001
8 Esplanade East Calcutta-700
Shastri Bhavan 35 Haddows as-600006
Printed at Kirpal Printi Shakti Nagar Delhi-7

ABOUT THE SERIES

The object of the series is to offer the general reader authentic accounts of the life and work of the great figures since the earliest times who have contributed in large measure to the culture and thought of India and influenced the mind and life of its people. The series will include about 125 such names—seers and philosophers, poets and dramatists, mystics and religious leaders, writers on science, aestheticians and composers.

The books are intended for the average reader who is keen to learn more about the past but who has no knowledge of details and is not interested in finer academic issues.

Dr. V. Raghavan, well-known Sanskrit scholar and Indologist, is the General Editor of the series.

some ...

PREFACE

The series of booklets entitled "Cultural Leaders of India" is intended to create better and greater awareness of Indian culture among the general reading public.

In the series, there are about 125 names of outstanding figures in Indian literature and thought who have moulded the mind, life and thought of the people, poets and dramatists, founders of philosophical systems and religious movements, social philosophers, writers on science, aestheticians, hymnists, mystics and composers.

The accounts of these will give the essential historical and biographical details of these figures as far as they have been either set forth in authoritative books by scholars and specialists or as accepted in tradition, without entering too much into academic discussions or controversies over dates, identities, etc. The works accepted as theirs are also dealt with, drawing special attention to the highlights, meaning, beauty, significance and influence of the works, without entering into detailed textual criticism and other academic problems.

The accounts bear an accent on the personality of the poet, philosopher or mystic dealt with, the appeal of his work or works, and the nature and extent of the influence of the author and his work on subsequent writers and the people at large.

It is expected that the evocatory and evaluatory presentation in these accounts will produce an adequate appreciation of the contribution of these personalities to the building up and enrichment of Indian culture.

The series was conceived some time ago and it took

time to arrange for satisfactory contributions from representative scholars. Efforts were made to enlist the co-operation of writers from all over the country. We are glad that we have been able to go into print and bring out one of the volumes for which the material was first ready, the fourth in the scheme, on the founders of the six philosophical systems.

Of the different branches of knowledge which the ancient Indian mind developed, the high water-mark is represented by the schools of philosophy. Indian tradition itself considers philosophy as the higher, greater knowledge. Parā vidyā, the Upaniṣad says, is that by which the Imperishable truth is attained : 'Yayā tad akṣaram adhigamyate.' All the rest is lower, aparā. In the words of the Gītā, philosophy is the Vidyā of Vidyās, knowledge par excellence (adhyātma-vidyā vidyānām). Indian philosophy represents also the world's oldest philosophical tradition, one that had not only the longest and most continuous development, but also a rich and varied growth, reaching up to the modern times.

The Indian schools of philosophy grew out of the Vedas; two schools are wholly Vedic, the Mīmāṁsā and the Vedānta, and the four others—Sāṁkhya and Yoga, and Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya—have their seeds in the Vedas. On this ground, the six schools are classed as Vedic or Āstika, and from them are distinguished the two schools —Buddhism and Jainism—which are called Nāstika as they do not accept Vedic authority. But all these eight schools are products of the great thought ferment that characterised the post-Vedic age of thinkers.

Each school of philosophy is called a Darśana, meaning a view or a vision of the Truth. Each is also called a Śāstra, as it is a systematised pattern of thought. Indian philosophy is not a mere exercise in thought or ratiocination but an intuition and formulation of Truth

which is to lead to a way of life with the ultimate end of obtaining Release (Mokṣa) from mundane life bound by time and space, by a world of relationships, by the chain of cause and effect and by recurring cycles of births and deaths. The aims and aspirations of life are not only the pursuit of material gains (Artha) and pleasure (Kāma) but also virtue and morality which chasten life (Dharma) and spiritual enlightenment and freedom (Mokṣa). The greatest of these four aims is the last and it is to that Mokṣa that these schools of philosophy are addressed. The approach of Indian philosophy is an integrated one, and ethics and religion are not divorced from it. The final state is a realisation of the Truth and its direct experience (Anubhava).

The basic texts of these schools are in brief aphorisms, Sūtras. While being a help to easy memorisation, these Sūtras, which are like catch-words, have to be understood with the help of teachers and tradition, both of which play an important part in Indian philosophy. Because of their pithiness, they gave room for alternate explanations and within the same school, developed also sub-schools, for example, prominently in Vedānta, which are dealt with in the volume on the Ācāryas.

Each school is associated with a sage (ṛṣi) as its first promulgator, Sāṁkhya with Kapila, Yoga with Patañjali, Vaiśeṣika with Kaṇāda, Nyāya with Gautama, Mīmāṁsā with Jaimini and Vedānta with Bādarāyaṇa-Vyāsa. Because of their mutual relationship, these six schools fall into three groups of allied systems, Samāna-tantras. Sāṁkhya and Yoga go together; the philosophical framework of Sāṁkhya is accepted by Yoga, with the addition of God as the omniscient first Teacher. The speciality of Yoga is the practical aspect of the methods of mental control by which the philosophical ideal of the Sāṁkhya, namely, the isolation (Kai-

valya) of the Spirit from Matter is achieved. But Yoga as a Sādhana or preparatory discipline and means, irrespective of any philosophical doctrine, came to be accepted by all schools, including Buddhism and Jainism. Today, it has, with the help of science, grown in strength and gained a world-wide vogue. The Vaiśeṣika doctrines form the basis of Nyāya, both being schools of realism and pluralism. The speciality of Nyāya lies in its further treatment of logic and the science of debate. The two, in fact, became later one eclectic school and put forth a fresh and rich development of formal and semantic logic. The Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta go together because of their common Vedic basis but otherwise they differ fundamentally. The former is concerned with Karma and Dharma, the performance of ordained duty, but the latter to the opposite of Karma, namely, renunciation from activity; according to Vedānta, knowledge (Jnāna) is the means of Release (Mokṣa). Mīmāṁsā is thus related to the Karma-kāṇḍa (Saṁhitā and the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Vedas), Vedānta to the Upaniṣads. The Mīmāṁsā also made a valuable contribution to the science of interpreting texts; it came to be known therefore as Vākya Śāstra (the science of sentence). Likewise, the Nyāya, which taught the science of precise thinking, came to be known as Pramāṇa Śastra and the two constituted the basic disciplines of all scholarship. While all the rest, as philosophies in the main, receded to the background and survived only in their other ancillary contributions, Vedānta grew as Indian philosophy par excellence.

In the pages that follow, introductions to these six schools of Indian philosophy are provided by scholars who have made a special study of these schools of thought.

V. Raghavan

CONTENTS

Kapila	*A.G. Krishna Warrier*	1
Patañjali	*M.P. Pandit*	17
Kaṇāda	*Anantalal Thakur*	27
Gautama	*Anantalal Thakur*	39
Jaimini	*G.V. Devasthali*	55
Bādarāyaṇa	*T.M.P. Mahadevan*	67

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

A.G. Krishna Warrier
Professor of Sanskrit (Retd.)
Trivandrum

M.P. Pandit
Writer
Aurobindo Ashram
Pondicherry

Anantalal Thakur
Director
K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute
Patna

G.V. Devasthali
Professor
Sanskrit Dictionary Department
Deccan College
Poona

T.M.P. Mahadevan,
Director
Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy
University of Madras
Madras

KAPILA

A. G. Krishna Warrier

"Every philosophy and every system in India.... owes much to Kapila, perhaps the greatest name in the history of India in psychological and philosophical lines...Even if it be thousands of years back, yet he stands there, the shining, glorious, wonderful Kapila."[1] These words of Swami Vivekananda hardly exaggerate the pre-eminence of Kapila, the promulgator of the Sāṁkhya system of Indian philosophy about which Richard Garbe who specialised in it observed that it was the most significant system of philosophy that India had produced.[2]

True, some scholars have questioned the historicity of Kapila; but the balance of considerations for and against it strongly suggests that he was an original thinker who flourished before the Buddha and, at least, before some of the Upaniṣads. As Max Müller maintains,[3] names like Kapila, Vyāsa and Gotama have an ancient air about them. The fact that Kapila and some of his prominent followers are mentioned in the list[4] of revered personalities of the past deserving tarpaṇa or propitiation with daily libations points to a historical rather than to a fictitious personality. This impression is strengthened by a reference to Kapila in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*[5] :

1 *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda*, Vol. III, p. 327.
2 *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya*, p. xiv.
3 *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*, p. 308 (The Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, Vol. XVI.)
4 P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. V, Part II, f.n. 2247.
5 V. 2

ṛṣiṁ prasūtaṁ Kapilaṁ yastamagre
jñānairbibharti jāyamānaṁ ca paśyet

(Who bears in his thoughts and beholds when born, that Kapila, seer, who was engendered in the beginning.)

Śaṅkara, the Advaitic philosopher, grants that in this context, in the opinion of many scholars, the reference is to the reputed promulgator of the Sāṁkhya philosophy, though he himself dissents from such a view.[1] The *Bhagavadgītā* lauds Kapila as the foremost among the siddhas or perfected sages: *siddhānāṁ Kapilo muniḥ*.[2] This phrasing is in harmony with the traditional Sāṁkhya-yoga description of the sage as ādividvān,[3] the primordial sage, and paramaṛṣi,[4] the supreme seer.

The historicity of Kapila is strengthened by a reference to him in the *Baudhāyanadharmasūtra*[5], which says that Kapila was an asura, Prahlāda's son, who instituted the life of renunciation or sannyāsa so that eligible candidates may adopt it as an alternative. The spirit of this passage agrees with an episode[6] associated with Kapila. It is narrated that he repeatedly induced the Brāhman Āsuri to renounce his householder's life and embrace sannyāsa. Thus it seems safe to conclude that in ancient times, before the birth of the

---

1 *Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.1.1

2 10.26

3 *Yogabhāṣya* of Vyāsa, 1.25

4 *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 69

5 2.11.30

6 Comment on verse I, *Suvarnasaptati śāstra*, Ed. by N. Aiyasami Sastri, Tirupati, 1944.

Buddha who, as Siddhārtha, learned from Arāda the principles of the Sāṁkhya,[1] there flourished a great philosopher-sage noted for his dispassion and asceticism.

The Purāṇas like the *Bhāgavata*[2] represent Kapila as a partial avatāra of Viṣṇu. He was born as the son of Kardama Prajāpati and Devahūti. In the Puranic narrative, perhaps, may be detected an effort to bring within the pale of orthodoxy an outstanding leader of a heterodox school of thought, a treatment similar to that which the Buddha himself received, when, later, he was declared to be an incarnation of Viṣṇu. One thing stands out in all traditional accounts of Kapila: he was not only noted for his extraordinary knowledge, but also for his boundless compassion. From the comment[3] on the *Suvarṇasaptati* verse, we learn that Kapila was born equipped with knowledge, dispassion and power. He saw the world plunged in the gloom of ignorance. Great compassion held him in its grip. Then he saw a Brāhmaṇa, Āsuri, wedded to the cult of sacrifice. Invisible, he approached Āsuri and remarked: "Āsuri, you are happy in your life as house-holder." And then he turned back. After the lapse of a thousand years Kapila once more returned and addressed the same remark to Āsuri. The latter replied, "Indeed, Lord, I am happy." Thereupon the sage silently withdrew. A third time he came and repeated the original observation. Āsuri's reply was the same. But Kapila asked, "Are you ready to practise strict celibacy? The Brāhmaṇa replied, "I am." Then renouncing the

---

1 Vide *Buddhacarita*, canto 12

2 Skandha III, 21.25

3 See note 6 on page 2

householder's life Āsuri became the first disciple of Kapila.

That compassion characterised Kapila has to be stressed. That was also the mark of the Buddha who was born in the village of Kapilavastu, evidently consecrated by long association with Kapila. The mainspring of Kapila's philosophy as well as its starting-point is his concern for the sufferings, the three-fold pain, engulfing all life. It is as an absolute and infallible cure for this pervasive pain that Kapila imparted to his disciple Āsuri the system of ordered knowledge, known ever afterwards as the Sāṁkhya. The tradition[1] is that with this end in view, the primordial sage communicated to Āsuri the principles of his system.

The question whether Kapila only taught by word of mouth or produced some works also is not easy to answer. That the work known as the *Sāṁkhyasūtras* commented upon, among others, by Vijñānabhikṣu cannot be ascribed to Kapila is clear from the fact that it was not known either to Śaṅkara in the eighth century or Mādhava in the fourteenth century. They refer only to the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa who lived in the second century A.D. Neither may the *Tattvasamāsa* nor the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* be deemed Kapila's work for the same reason. On the other hand, verse 70 in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* has led several scholars to advance the hypothesis that Kapila's own teaching was not atheistic, whereas the classical Sāṁkhya in the *Sāṁkhyakārikā* is atheistic due, it is surmised, to its reformulation by Pañcaśikha.

Now, the salient principles of Kapila's philosophy may

---

1 *Yogabhāṣya*, 1.25

be briefly set forth. In sharp contrast to the naive world-view of the man in the street who takes as real the strife and division that surround him on all sides, Kapila teaches that the realm of objects is in truth a scene of continuities, of differentiations grounded in, and integrated with, a basic unity. The foundation of the objective realm is prakṛti. It is not the colourful, resonant Nature, rich in qualities, that confronts man, but a sort of *Urstoff*, undeveloped and invisible, avyaktam. This basic objective reality is an unintelligent, composite entity made up of three constituents or guṇas which, however, are substances and not qualities. The number three, in this context, refers to the types of the reals involved; for, each of the three guṇas, sattva, rajas and tamas, is in fact a group of countless active entities manifesting themselves in the world within and without as pleasure, pain and delusion; illumination, action and restraint; buoyancy, mobility and inertia.[1] This implies that both the physical and psychological features of the world are the manifestations of a single principle, prakṛti. Prakṛti is held to have two distinctive states, quiescent and emergent. In the quiescent state, constituent guṇas are in a state of sāmya or dynamic equilibrium; in the emergent they are in a state of vaiṣamya or instability, which drives them to clash and co-operate and strive for ascendancy.

The reality of prakṛti is established by anumāna or inference, the second of the three means of right cognition admitted by Kapila. The objects in our world are limited in space and time, and so they point to something else as their source and cause. All these objects share certain common characteristics such as their capacity to present

---

1 *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 12, 13

themselves as pleasant, painful, or delusive, and thus point to a common origin. The resultant energy of the universe of effects also entails a corresponding causal state of that energy; for, the development of effects implies a developing principle, viz., the causal energy and substance. The very line drawn between causes and effects suggests a vast source of causal energy, which alone can account for this universe of effects. Also, there is an unmistakable unity of all material forms or vaiśvarūpyam. No part of this universe can exist independently of the rest. In other words, there is an unbroken continuity from the lowest inorganic to the highest organic forms. These considerations, in their sum, point to a common source of the universe, which Kapila styles prakṛti.

The metaphysical principle on which the above arguments are based is known as the satkāryavāda,[1] the pre-existence of effects in their material causes. The process by which the effect becomes available for practical use is an evolution or pariṇāma of the material cause. Thus Kapila discards the unscientific notion of creation out of nothing. Nothing comes from nothing. Our world of concrete effects, even before its manifestation, was existent or *sat* in its material cause, viz., the three-fold prakṛti. The question, however, inevitably arises why and how this unintelligent prakṛti evolves an ordered world of effects, so wonderfully equipped to maintain and develop the life of intelligent human beings. In reply Kapila points to the spiritual pole of the universe, the puruṣa or intelligence, that perceives the objective world. This spiritual principle must be recognised because any organisation of objects, like a house, points to an intelligent being for

1 *Ibid.*, 9

whose use it has been designed. Similarly, the ordered realm of objects pre-supposes its counterpart or counterparts for whose sake it exists. The experience of pleasure and pain, too, entails an intelligent experiencer. Above all, there is a movement, no matter how subtle or weak, away from the flux and complexity of the objective world towards simplicity and isolation.

According to Kapila, spirit is multiple—there are as many puruṣas as there are living beings. As proof of his contention he points to the fact that experiences of no two human beings are identical. Birth, pleasure, pain and death are not simultaneous as they would have been, had they been related to a single spirit. Prakṛti operates to cater to them all. To explain how an unintelligent principle like prakṛti may promote the interests of its exact opposite, the spirits, Kapila postulates a teleology immanent in this very prakṛti, blind yet infallible, which promotes both the sāṁsāric experiences and ultimate emancipation of the spirits.

The biography of each puruṣa in any given life starts with the evolution of the psycho-physical complex which embodies him. There is no absolute beginning in time for the transmigratory life of man. The course of evolution begins with the formation of mahat or buddhi, the psychological principle of will and determination. Like every product of prakṛti, buddhi too is compounded of the three guṇas; it is sāttvic or rājasic or tāmasic, characterised, respectively, by knowledge and dispassion; cravings and anger; inertia and dullness. In the case of each buddhi one of these three guṇas may dominate, the other two being subservient. In its turn, the buddhi evolves ahaṁkāra or self-sense, the principle of individuation. Psychologically, however, the self-sense pre-

supposes an objective non-ego, and to account for it Kapila may very well point to two parallel streams of evolution, individual and cosmic. Thus, corresponding to each principle evolved on the individual side, there may be a cosmic counterpart. Therefore one may speak of a cosmic mahat, a cosmic ahaṁkāra, etc., so that the objective realm, the *sine qua non* of the evolution of the self-sense, may very well be supplied by prakṛti in the cosmic aspect of its evolution.

Ahaṁkāra has three significant aspects, the vaikārika or sāttvic nature, the taijasa or rājasic, and the bhūtādi or tāmasic. From the vaikārika evolve mind or manas, the five organs of perception and the five of action, while from the bhūtādi evolve the five tanmātras or the subtle elements. Vaikārika and bhūtādi are urged into activity by the impetus of the taijasa. These subtle elements of sounds, touch, colour, taste and smell, in their turn, evolve into the respective gross elements of ākāśa (ether), vāyu (wind), tejas (fire), āpaḥ (water) and pṛthivī (earth). What maintains the various stadia of this evolution in being intact is the unfailing supply of material from the inexhaustible fund of prakṛti by a process described by Patañjali as prakṛtyāpūra,[1] or infilling.

Thus, each individual is a microcosm according to Kapila with its ruling spirit or puruṣa and a complement of 24 material principles, viz., prakṛti, mahat, ahaṁkāra, manas, 5 organs of perception, 5 of action, 5 tanmātras, and 5 mahābhūtas. Corresponding and common to all these is a macrocosm, though this correspondence has not been stressed, perhaps because in that case a theistic world-view would have become unavoïdable.

---

1 *Yogabhāṣya*, 4.2

To be embodied implies that the puruṣa is in bondage. What is the sense and implication of this bondage ? How can spirit and matter, as opposed to each other as light and darkness, enter into any sort of relation at all ? Two explanations have been offered to unveil this mystery. Vācaspatimiśra explains that the state of bondage means that puruṣa is reflected in the sāttvic modifications of the buddhi, the material term closest to the spirit. This reflection, as of the moon in the waves, imparts to the puruṣa a sense of participation in the restless waves of the buddhi and this is the essence of his bondage. Vijñāna-bhikṣu deems this one-sided reflection inadequate as an explanation of the facts of life, and suggests that there is a further reflection, back in the spirit, of the intelligised modifications of the buddhi too. Thus alone can be explained the puruṣa's experience of finitude, agency and pain.

The consequence of bondage is the experience of three-fold pain,[1] and there is no sure and permanent remedy for it except the cultivation of the knowledge of the distinction between spirit and matter. Hence the motto "*ekameva darśanam, Sāṁkhyameva darśanam*", which Pañcaśikha, distinguished teacher of the Sāṁkhya philosophy, has given to the world. Through Prakṛti-puruṣa-anyathākhyāti, the knowledge[2] of distinction alone, will the subtle body or liṅgam[3], the vehicle of the spirit in its beginningless rambles through life, fall away from the spirit and set it unencumbered and free for ever. It is surprising that the prakṛti which binds the spirit through its rājasic and tāmasic forces is the same agency that liberates it through

1 *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 1
2 *Ibid.*, 37; *Yogasūtra* of Patañjali, 3.49
3 *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 40, 41

its sāttvic urges.[1] According to Kapila, emancipation is not necessarily a post-mortem state. Living in the body, puruṣa may be liberated, provided the buddhi transforms itself into a mode whose content is the distinction between matter and spirit. This knowledge has to be cultivated and rendered stable; its final form or content may be expressed thus : '*nāsmi, na me, nāham*[2]—Neither action, nor property, nor agency pertains to the spirit. Borne by the momentum of past activities which have already begun to bear fruit, the body of the jīvanmukta, or the emancipated sage, may survive, awhile, like a revolving potter's wheel, even after the pot has been fashioned. When that momentum is exhausted, the psycho-physical complex is resolved back into its source, prakṛti, and the puruṣa remains in its eternal status of freedom and aloofness. Prakṛti operates no more in regard to the spirit thus freed.

The system of ancient thought, briefly and in its barest outlines, set forth above is a marvellous anticipation of the scientific principle of the conservation of energy; for, the theory of satkāryavāda, in its essence, is a statement of the truth that there is nothing in the effect which was not already present, though in a different collocation, in the cause. The wide sweep and implications of its theory of guṇas also deserve to be stressed. The sāttvic, the rājasic, and the tāmasic temperaments refer to three widely recognised groups with which may be compared Dr. Sheldon's well-known triple division of temperaments into the cerebrotonic, somatotonic, and the viscerotonic.[3] The

---

1 *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 63
Ibid., 64

3 Aldous Huxley, *The Perennial Philosophy*, pp. 171ff

postulation of the two co-ordinate principles of spirit and matter, puruṣa and prakṛti, successfully avoids the insurmountable difficulty of deriving either from the other. Rigorously monistic systems of thought, of course, experience this difficulty. For instance, in the Advaita of Śaṅkara the effort to derive the material world from Brahman, the pure spirit, has proved a great difficulty which is but disguised behind by characterisation of the world as māyā or illusion. Equally futile have been the efforts of Marx, the material monist, to derive spirit or consciousness from his foundational reality, viz., matter. In sharp contrast, Kapila insists on an eternal confrontation between multiple spirit and composite matter. By grading his matter as gross, active and translucent, he sought to build a bridge to make the commerce between spirit and matter plausible.

The luminous truth embodied in the Sāṁkhya system is the radical distinction, viveka, between spirit and matter, consciousness and its object. On this is based the demand for renunciation of the world addressed to those who would cultivate the spirit or seriously live the religious life.[1] On the other hand, Kapila's theory of matter implies that matter in its essence is not imperfect or evil; as sattva, it contains the possibility of perfection and goodness even as the possibility of imperfection and evil as tamas.

Another noteworthy implication of the Sāṁkhya theory of matter is that the world will never come to a point of total dissolution. It follows an unending rhythm, in union with unliberated puruṣa, of evolutions and involu-

---

1 *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 3.5.1

tions. In this doctrine is implicit the theory of Kalpas, or world cycles following one another. This has been universally adopted in Indian thought, orthodox and heterodox.

The Sāṁkhya idea of the mechanism by which the departed spirits transmigrate from one form and scene of sāṁsāric life to another has also found a wide measure of acceptance among Hindus of all persuasions. The Sāṁkhya teaching in this regard relates to the liṅga-śarīra or subtle body formed out of the eighteen evolutes of prakṛti, viz., the buddhi, ahaṁkāra, manas, the ten organs of perception and action, and the five subtle forms of matter or tanmātras. This subtle body is inseparably connected with the puruṣa whose minister it is until its use is finally over. It has a separate existence from the womb-born, gross body. The latter alone falls off at the time of death; the subtle body survives and forms the vehicle of the transmigratory spirit. This teaching constitutes the standard Hindu explanation of the process of metempsychosis.

Whereas in its general outlines the idea of an evolution or emanation of effects from a pre-existent material cause is a remarkable anticipation of the scientific theory of evolution, considerable difficulties are met with on closer scrutiny. Logically, it is not clear how buddhi, ahaṁkāra and the rest may be deduced from the first cause, prakṛti. These psychological principles are not chronologically successive. For instance, originally buddhi could not have meant the faculty of adhyavasāya or determination; for, determination presupposes all subsequent terms like ahaṁkāra, etc., including the knowable. Therefore buddhi should denote a cosmic evolute rather than a psychological faculty, private to an individual. On this

cosmic scale, buddhi would stand for a state of prakṛti, intellectualised and illuminated, the living germ of ahaṁkāra. Only after prakṛti becomes perceptive can the distinction between subject and object, between 'I' and 'thou' possibly arise. Thus the traditional order of evolution from prakṛti seems to contradict the psychological sequence which begins with sensation, and goes on to perception and judgment, based respectively on the sense organs, mind, ego-sense and the intellect.

Equally hard is it to grant the Sāṁkhya contention[1] that prakṛti in manifold ways altruistically acts to promote the interests of puruṣas. Analogies based on the flow of the cow's milk to nourish the calf and on the co-operation of the lame and the blind are obviously inadequate. The role of instinct and intelligence in both these examples is patent. To make prakṛti an agent and, still, to deny her the capacity to enjoy the fruits of her actions is arbitrary. Indeed, it invites the sarcastic remark:

kartumeva vijānāti pradhānaṁ vyañjanādikam
bhoktuṁ na ca vijānāti kimayuktamataḥ param[2]

"Prakṛti is adept in cooking an excellent meal; but she does not know how to eat it ! What a ridiculous contention !" The fact is that prakṛti is as much an abstraction in the system of Kapila as the puruṣa; its name avyakta suggests also its vagueness as a concept. It is the formless substrate of all objects. The three guṇas of prakṛti represent three moments of all being. To look upon sattva, rajas and tamas as mutually opposed and yet constituting all objects suggests that these are uneasy states of conflict seeking to transcend themselves. There can be

1 *Saṁkhyakārikā*, 60
2 *Tattvasaṁgraha*, verse, 300

neither rest nor harmony in prakṛti. This is tacitly recognised as it is affirmed that even in pralaya there is a tension among the guṇas. To give this state any meaning, a puruṣa who will determine it, one way or another has to be introduced. The real is that in which the opposition of guṇas is overcome. Prakṛti cannot be the real, because it is an endless process, relative to something else than herself. This inherent dependence, parārthatā, is the hall-mark of the unreal. Obviously, prakṛti was felt to answer more the requirements of a concept like that of māyā with which, in fact, it came to be identified later.

If prakṛti is deemed wholly material and mechanical, there can be no freedom of will; for, will also in the Sāṁkhya is a product of prakṛti. It is recognised that man has duties to perform, vices to avoid and virtues to cultivate. Some element in man is felt to be free. With the full recognition of this truth, it is difficult to reconcile the independent and co-ordinate reality of prakṛti.

The Sāṁkhya theory that puruṣas are countless is also difficult to sustain. To hold that the transcendent spirit, "without variableness or shadow of turning" is plural, is to make it incomprehensible. What is patently plural is not spirit, but the empirical jīva or the embodied spirit. Number, a characteristic of bits of matter, extended in space and time, may not legitimately be predicated of the spaceless and timeless spirit or puruṣa. The Sāṁkhya arguments for the plurality of puruṣas apply only to jīvas or the empirical selves.

Equally gratuitous is it to attribute bondage and liberation to the pure spirit which nothing material can touch or tarnish. Not only Sāṁkhya commentators like Gauḍapāda and Vijñānabhikṣu but also Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of the *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, have felt the untenability of

predicating these states of the immutable spirit—*tasmāt na badhyate' ddhā na mucyate nāpi saṁsarati kaścit.*[1] (Therefore, verily, spirit is neither bound nor liberated; neither does it transmigrate.) The metaphysical truth, therefore, implicit in Kapila's system of philosophy, is that all conditions, physical and psychological, pertain to prakṛti alone—*saṁsarati, badhyate, mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ.* Such a formulation takes the Sāṁkhya system close to the Advaitic position according to which spirit only *appears* to undergo the vicissitudes of transmigratory life due to the power of māyā. In fact, the inevitable step, under the relentless pressure of logic, was taken of identifying Kapila's prakṛti with the Advaitin's māyā as early as the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* which exhorts—*māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt*[2]—know that prakṛti is māyā.

The main weakness of Kapila's system consists in the creation of a logically unbridgeable chasm between the only two principles it acknowledges as primary. Without an almighty and intelligent co-ordinator or God, the two realms of spirit and matter must remain out of bounds to each other. In this connection it may be pointed out that the so-called atheism of Kapila is mild, almost negative. He is not concerned to deny the reality of a personal God or Maheśvara. His point is that no *arguments* can irrefutably establish God's reality, and on this subject Kapila and Kant think alike. The innocuousness of Kapila's atheism has been underscored by Vijñānabhikṣu in the *Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya.* This may indeed be the explanation of the universal diffusion of the Sāṁkhya ideology in the *Mahābhārata*, and the Purāṇa literature.

Nevertheless, a deep and unmistakable unity between

1 *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, 62
2 4.10

matter and spirit is implied throughout the thought of Kapila. Experience of the world and achievement of apavarga are inconceivable without a unity of purpose and endeavour between puruṣa and prakṛti. Puruṣa informs prakṛti in all stages of its evolution; indeed, buddhi, the first product of prakṛti, acts as puruṣa throughout the transmigratory life.

On the whole, then, it is indisputable that this ancient system of philosophy is a wonderful, intellectual achievement. "Rarely in human thought has a theoretical problem been so clearly recognised; rarely has a solution been undertaken and achieved with such clear judgment."[1]

---

1 A. Schweitzer, *Indian Thought*, p. 73

PATAÑJALI

M. P. Pandit

There is a tradition that sage Patañjali gave the science of medicine for the health of the body, the science of grammar for accuracy of speech and the science of yoga for the well-being of the soul. But like most traditions of this type, it is probably apocryphal. Patañjali, the author of the aphorisms on yoga, belongs to a different epoch of mentality and expression from that which gave rise to the celebrated grammarian or the writer of the *Caraka-saṁhitā*. It is difficult to determine the age of Patañjali with any precision, though some scholars would have it the 2nd century B.C.

Secondly, Patañjali is not the founder of the science of yoga. The aphorisms that have come down under his name are only notations of a knowledge that was current at that time. For, yoga as such has an ancient origin and it has had many lines of development. Right from the recorded beginnings of Aryan history, we come across references, veiled and open, in the hymns of the Vedas to the different paths pursued by the seekers of the Infinite to realise and embody the Supreme Godhead. The yoga of consecration, the yoga of adoration, the yoga of the Name—to mention some of them—are found adumbrated in the litany revealing their contours to a discerning eye. The tradition of this ascension into the Godhead by the human soul continues in the Upaniṣad under the nomenclature of so many vidyās. But all these ways of inner development were never fixed into cut and dried formulas. They were living traditions to be received

and fostered at the hands of the adepts. The yoga of Patañjali represents the systematisation of one such line of yoga come down from a dateless past.

Each yoga selects its particular field of action according to its aim, and its workings are confined to that area. Thus Haṭhayoga concerns itself mainly with the physical apparatus of man and aims at its development and perfection; it concentrates upon the physical body and its functionings though it draws upon the operations of the life-force, prāṇa, for its aid. Similarly, the yoga systematised by Patañjali, commonly known as Rājayoga, is mainly psycho-physical. It selects the psychological system of man and through a severe disciplining of it, acquires a control sufficient enough to make it open and responsive to the spiritual entity within, the self, the puruṣa. The mind-stuff is trained to shed its ordinary nature and acquire the character of the inner spiritual principle, imbibe its freedom from nature, prakṛti, and radiate its light. The sūtras (aphorisms) sketch the method perfected for the purpose.

In this treatise of 195 sūtras (196 according to some), philosophy is more or less kept in the background. The system prescribed here is more a practical discipline, a methodical effort for the betterment, elevation and perfection of human life, than a metaphysical exercise for the intellect. Whatever philosophical base is necessary is taken from the school of Sāṁkhya, with the notable addition of the concept of *God*. The work is divided into four Books.

The first Book defines the scheme and scope of the work. What is yoga? What is its aim? How does it start and where does it culminate? What are the states

of consciousness, trance, samādhi, that are developed for the realisation of the goal and by what processes? These are the topics of the first section aptly called samādhi-pāda.

The second Book discusses the general principles that govern the practical aspect of this yoga. Why is yoga necessary? What are the factors that compel one to take to yoga? What are the steps of this discipline, sādhana? As the section expounds the necessity of this sādhana for man and the preliminary and the positive steps thereof, it is called sādhanapāda.

The third Book continues with the description of the various steps of the discipline—the internal steps that follow the external dealt with in the previous Book—and goes on to describe the gains and attainments—spiritual and temporal—that result from the successful practice of the yoga. Since the description of these siddhis, glorious accomplishments, forms a major part of this section, it is called vibhūtipāda.

The fourth Book discusses the various philosophical problems involved and the concepts implied in the treatment, e.g., mind-stuff, citta, desire, ego, vāsanās (sense impressions), the content of liberation into the status of the Self, etc. As the main goal of all this effort under discussion is the state of absolute freedom, it is called kaivalyapāda.

Let us now turn to the broad features of the yoga enunciated in these aphorisms.

Man is normally an unhappy and unfulfilled being. He is involved and helplessly carried round in a complex of actions and reactions, desires and limitations, births and deaths. He is a slave of nature over whose movements

he has little control. His real central being, puruṣa, is veiled by these activities of the prakṛti in which the functional mind, life and body are held prisoner. There is, however, a way to disentangle oneself from this hold of nature and realise the free status of the uninvolved self within. And that is the way of yoga. This yoga, says Patañjali, has eight limbs, aṣṭāṅga.

The first and foremost requirement is an adequate mental and moral purification. Without this condition one cannot hope to undertake the task successfully. This purification is achieved by a ten-fold discipline of restraints, yama, and injunctions, niyama, the first and the second limbs or steps. They are : abstinence from injury or violence to another, in thought, speech or act, ahimsā; truth in thought, word and action, satya; refraining from taking what belongs to another, asteya; continence, retention of sex-force without wasting it in any form, gross or subtle, brahmacarya; excision of greed for anything for one's own enjoyment, aparigraha. The observances enjoined upon the novice are: purity of the whole being, mental, vital and physical, śauca; contentment which keeps the system free from strain, santoṣa; austerity, practice of marshalling one's forces for exertion to purpose, tapas; study of authentic scriptures, svādhyāya; adoration and inner surrender to the Divine. īśvara-praṇidhāna. This is the basic outline of the discipline which the seeker has to make part of his daily life.

The next step is to learn and habituate oneself to a position or posture of the body in which the yogic practice can best be done, āsana. Though there are many postures prescribed in the yoga-texts, Patañjali prescribes that that āsana is the best in which one finds oneself at ease and steady. The right āsana is one in which the body can

remain stationary for a considerable period without getting restless and in which it can forget itself.

This done, there is the further step of regulation of breath. The body, mind and the life-force are closely interconnected and the control of the breath, which is the most graspable of the operations of the life-energy, gives a certain hold over the states of the body and the mind. To this end, the current of breath is sought to be steadied and regulated in its incoming, retention and outgoing. This practice, called prāṇāyāma, induces a steadiness in the body, brings the restless mind under control and promotes a serenity in the being. Prāṇāyāma also effects a much-needed purification of the subtle nerve-channels, nādīs, through which the life-currents flow, and all disordered movements, irregulated currents, within the system are progressively set right and harmonised.

When this is effected in a sufficient measure, the mind is gradually trained to withdraw itself from its usual preoccupations with the objects outside, whether in the physical or the mental world. The withdrawal of the mental faculties from the habitual movements outward and the turning of their gaze inward is called pratyāhāra.

These five steps, yama, niyama, āsana, prāṇāyāma, and pratyāhāra, are the external, bahiranga, limbs of the yoga. They are followed by the internal, the more subjective, antaranga, steps.

The first of these is concentration, dhāraṇā. It is the holding of the mental energies centred round one object. The object may be anything of one's choice, a Name, a Form, an Idea. Necessarily, the object of concentration in this context is something that points to the Goal, a symbol of the Reality that is sought for. The

mind, withdrawn from other activities, is confined to the object before it.

Once this exercise of concentration is mastered with a fair degree of success, the next step is a continued dwelling upon the object, the nature of the object, the truth it embodies, in an uninterrupted flow. This is called meditation, dhyāna. It is a more extended operation than the concentration which precedes it. As the dhyāna proceeds, the distinction between the subject and the object, the one who sees and the thing seen, the knower and the known, gradually fades, the consciousness of the practitioner tends to fuse with the object meditated upon. As a result of this focussing of the meditative consciousness on the object,—be it a Form or an Idea—there is a steady unfoldment of the content of the object, of the Reality that ensouls it.

There comes about a gradual change in one's consciousness. New layers of consciousness come alive and deeper and deeper regions of the being are thrown open. The usual activity of the mind falls silent and the operations of a larger and deeper awareness, the luminous consciousness of the soul, begin to form.

As the limited awareness of the mind is replaced by a larger and deeper consciousness, as the area of awareness is extended with the enlivening of the levels of a greater consciousness, there is also the manifestation of the characteristic powers of those organisations of consciousness. These powers—natural to those higher grades of consciousness—are abnormal or supernormal to our common awareness because we are not awake in their corresponding matrices of consciousness. But they are latent in all, awaiting the proper conditions to manifest. In the process of this yoga, these powers come into play

either spontaneously or as a result of concentration on appropriate formulations of consciousness. Patañjali describes some of these, e.g., knowledge of the past and the future, knowledge of the sounds of all living beings, knowledge of other minds, knowledge of the planets, capacity to make oneself invisible, conquest of hunger, thirst, etc. These however, remarks the sage, are not relevant to the purpose of sādhana, they may even retard the progress if they are allowed to distract attention.

The process of dhyāna, as we have seen, leads to the state of consciousness in which the mental being loses its separate identity and becomes absorbed in the nature of the object, becomes one with it. It is the state of samādhi in which the consciousness is well-poised in contemplation, freed from any pull from elsewhere. But this is a culmination. There are several steps leading to it.

The state in which the duality of the subject and the object remains is called savitarka, contemplative, samādhi; when this consciousness of the object is put behind, then it is nirvitarka, supra-contemplative, samādhi. These terms apply when the objects of meditation are gross. When they are of the subtle type, e.g., qualities, ideas, etc., then they are termed savicāra, reflective, samādhi, and nirvicāra, supra-reflective samādhi. When the object of knowledge fades as a separate object and one is aware of the inner apparatus of cognition only, there is a settling of bliss, it is sānanda samādhi. Next, when even this awareness of the process of comprehension is lost and there is only the awareness of the knower, the Self, which reflects itself in the buddhi as simply 'I', asmi, that is sāsmitā samādhi.

All these states of samādhi are stages of samprajñāta samādhi in which there is a knowledge-activity of some

kind or other, vikalpa, from which are formed impressions that become the bīja, seeds, of future activity. Hence it is also called sabīja samādhi. There is in those states some object—of whatever subtlety—on which the consciousness supports itself, ālambana; so it is also known as sālamba samādhi.

Even these currents of knowledge, however fine they are, are to be checked and silenced. When that too is done there comes what is called asamprajñāta samādhi, where there is no movement of consciousness even into knowledge. There is no seed left that can sprout, it is nirbīja; there is no object on which the mind needs to support itself, it is nirālamba; the consciousness is one with the Self. It becomes absolutely still, it is alone, kevala. In that state the puruṣa, the Self, shines in his innate glory.

This, in sum, is the course of the aṣṭāṅga yoga which frees man from his helpless entanglement in the currents of egoity, desire and ignorance by a progressive discipline of rejection, purification, detachment, observation, concentration, meditation, and absorption in subtler and still subtler states of consciousness till all the coverings of Nature are set aside one by one and an identity is gained with his pure Self which is for ever free.

This discipline of Pātañjala Yoga, however, has not been practised always in its bare purity. Often it was combined with other systems of God-seeking or Self-seeking. The main principles of purification, orientation and concentration were kept intact, but other techniques and powers were added and even the objectives were widened. This was notably so with the Tantrics who went on to develop their own lines of yoga, e.g., Kuṇḍalinī, Laya, Mantra, etc., assimilating the essentials of the aṣṭāṅga

yoga in their system. It is mostly these types of yoga that came to be known and practised in countries beyond the borders of India, viz., Tibet, China, Japan, etc., when Buddhist missionaries carried the sacred lore. They underwent inevitable modifications there but the basic notes of Patañjali are unmistakable everywhere.

The yoga sets for itself a limited object—liberation from Nature—and achieves it by a rigorous discipline involving the control and regulation of the physical and psychological parts of the system. It does not educate or enlarge or transform them for any illumined action on the world; it stills them into immobility so that the Self at the core may be arrived at and held to securely. The parts of the being, the life-forces, the emotions, the dynamic energies of the mind, and the physical body, are left as they were to continue their attenuated functionings till the body is shed. Further, the salvation is of an individual character without consequence for the collective movement of humanity.

All the same, there is much of value in this system for every seeker of the spiritual Reality of life. The elements of psychological purification, the control of the mental energies, the culturing of the different levels of consciousness between the sense-mind and the pure Spirit, all enter into the other forms of yoga in one way or another. Patañjali's analysis of the mental make-up of the human system, the depths of consciousness in which the vāsanās, sense-impressions, strike root and the challenge they pose to every effort at correction or change of nature, and his unerring perception that the key to well-being or ill-being lies in the psychic condition, are truths that are being rediscovered today by the different branches of modern science. Conclusions of para-psychology, psychosomatic research

and even what are known as 'psychic' experiments are found to have been anticipated in this Science of Yoga. Man is much more than the mind, the life-force and the body-organism of which he is conscious. There are layers and layers of his being which throw themselves open as one delves within. The key to life is within. Our consciousness is to be enlarged, its range of awareness expanded; only thus do the powers and faculties that are inherent in the consciousness, cit, get awakened and enlivened, opening vistas after vistas of extended and heightened effectivity of life.

Patañjali is an open book on the art and science of this exploration and mastery.

KAṆĀDA

Anantalal Thakur

Among the founders of the different philosophical schools of India Kaṇāda, author of the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana*, holds a unique position. As the grammar of Pāṇini is indispensable to a student of Sanskrit, so is this Darśana indispensable to a student of Indian philosophy.

Not much is known about Kaṇāda, the author of the system. He is called Kaṇāda, Kaṇabhuk, Kaṇacara, Kaṇabhakṣa, Kaṇāśin and Kaṇavrata, all of which show his association with 'Kaṇas', grains or particles of food picked up. All the variations of the latter member of the compound making the name Kaṇāda mean 'to eat' and as such the epithet refers to his ascetic life and living on particles of food. This may be an indirect reference to the atomic theory propounded by him, as 'Kaṇa' may also be taken as 'atom'. This is also supported by other epithets, Pailuka and Pailukaṇṭha, in which the term Pīlu stands for aṇu (atom). According to a tradition recorded in the *Nyāyakandalī* of Śrīdhara, the sage lived on the unclaimed scattered grains collected on the roads or fields after harvests. This points to his observance of the highest vow of asceticism. H. Ui has collected some accounts of the ascetic life of Kaṇāda from Chinese sources in his *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*. One such story says that he used to beg his food at night. This seeking one's livelihood at night resembled that of an owl and as such he was called Ulūka also, a name by which he is referred to in several texts. Guṇaratna and Rājaśekhara inform us that Lord Śiva appeared before the sage in the form of an owl and taught the Vaiśeṣika tenets to him. Ulūka was probably the personal name of

the sage and we hear in the *Mahābhārata* that a ṛṣi of this name was present by the bed-side of Bhīṣma at the time of the latter's death. By his gotra-name, the sage is again called Kāśyapa, son or descendant of Kaśyapa.

The author of the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana* is described as a muni, ṛṣi, maharṣi and devarṣi in various texts. But curiously enough in one sūtra Kaṇāda seems to distinguish himself from a ṛṣi.

His discipleship under Lord Śiva, already referred to, is attested by Udayana who records a tradition that the sage, on receiving the grace and appointment from the Great Lord, composed the Śāstra. In the concluding verse of the *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha*, Praśastapāda pays his obeisance to Kaṇabhuk who composed the *Vaiśeṣikaśāstra* after propitiating the Great Lord through his superhuman power of meditation and practice (yogācāra). This yoga seems to be identical with the *Pāśupata-yogaśāstra* with which Kaṇāda's connection has been suggested by several authorities. The *Vāyupurāṇa* accepts this connection and makes Kaṇāda, Akṣapāda, Ulūka and Vatsa sons of Somaśarman, an incarnation of Maheśvara at Prabhāsa in the twenty-seventh parivarta. The *Padmapurāṇa*, Uttara, CCXXXVI again shows that the Pāśupata and other Śaiva systems were the works of the Lord himself, while Kaṇāda, Gotama and Kapila propounded the Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya and Sāṁkhya, being inspired by him. Bhaṭṭa Vādindra refers to an earlier *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* by Lord Śiva; no other text mentions it.

We find in the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana* several references to the Vedas and the Vedic literature. The treatise declares itself to have been written for expounding dharma and the authority of the Vedas is also declared to be due to its exposition of the same (dharma). The term dharma here has been rightly taken for padārthadharma (properties of the categories) by Praśastapāda and Udayana. The Vedas

deal with the characteristics of the deities, sacrifices, objects utilised in the sacrifices, the self and so on. And we find Kaṇāda engaged in a similar pursuit throughout his treatise. There is also an inclination to take 'dharma' of Kaṇāda in the Mīmāṁsā sense of the term and to connect the origin of the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana* with the *Mīmāṁsādarśana*. This view, however, would not fit in with the declared object of the sage himself. The practice of determination of the characteristics of entities (padārthadharma) by contrast and comparison (sādharmya and vaidharmya) might have begun in early Vedic society, especially among the sacrificers, who were keen to perform sacrifices with faultless articles (utensils and offerings). In order to use articles proper to a rite, a knowledge of their qualities was essential. What Kaṇāda did was to treat systematically on a broader basis what had already been done in the Vedic society for sacrificial and other religious needs. Frequent references to the Vedas, Brhhmaṇas, Vedic rites and customs in the treatise of Kaṇāda stand in the way of accepting an anti-Vedic origin of the system suggested by different authorities.

Kaṇāda is sometimes called a nāstika but this is not correct. The term nāstika has no fixed connotation. But generally one is called a nāstika when one does not accept (a) the life after death, (b) the inevitableness of the result of one's action, (c) existence of God as the creator of the universe or (d) authority of the Vedas. Kaṇāda and his followers, without doubt, accept life after death and the inevitable result of one's actions. We have seen above that he accepts the authority of the Vedas in his own way. We have further seen that tradition makes him a Pāśupata or Māheśvara. But the *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* nowhere mention God. All the known commentators of these sūtras are, however, theists and present Kaṇāda as such. Most of the writers of Vaiśeṣika digests are also theists. Kaṇāda himself was a Pāśupata and the Purāṇas make him a

Pāśupatācārya along with Gautama. Again Kaṇāda was always accepted as an āstika and his darśana is counted as one of the six āstika-darśanas.

Even if one doubts Kaṇāda's acceptance of God, he should not be called a nāstika as no one will call the Sāṁkhyas and the Mīmāṁsakas as such, though neither of these schools accepts God.

Of the different systems of Indian philosophy Kaṇāda's treatise presupposes only the Mīmāṁsā and the Sāṁkhya speculations and no reference to the extant Sāṁkhya and Mīmāṁsā texts can be found in Kaṇāda's work. Both the systems had a long history before their codification and hence no positive relation between them and the Vaiśeṣika can be established. No reference to Buddhism or the Buddha is found in Kaṇāda's treatise. On the other hand, Chinese tradition places Kaṇāda eight centuries before the Buddha. The Buddha is said to have studied the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana* in his youth.

Modern scholars, however, do not agree in placing Kaṇāda in pre-Buddha days on the ground that Kauṭalya does not count the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana* among the Śāstras that he accepted as ānvīkṣikī. We shall deal with Kauṭalya's reference in connection with Gotama's system. It will suffice here to say that the term yoga in Kauṭalya's *Arthaśāstra* refers to Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika or both of them.

The only available treatise of Kaṇāda, called the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana*, consists of aphoristic sentences called sūtras. They are divided into ten chapters, the text therefore being referred to as *Daśalakṣaṇī*. Each chapter consists of two daily lessons (āhnikas) each. But some commentators including Candrānanda accepted one āhnika each in the last three chapters. We shall see presently that the *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha* seems to support the latter arrangement. There are indications that the sūtras were divided into clear sections called adhikāras consisting of the views of the opponent, theis examination and the

conclusion on the different topics. But the adhikāra-division is not preserved in any text. The sūtras themselves have sometimes been forgotten while additions and alterations took place in the readings of the existing ones. The ancient exegetical works like the *Vākya*, *Kaṭandī*, the *Bhāṣyas* of Rāvaṇa, and Ātreya, the *Bhāṣyaṭīkā* of Praśasta are known only from references. We have before us the *Vṛtti* of Candrānanda of unknown date, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra* of Śaṅkaramiśra (15th century A.D.), the first two chapters of the *Kaṇādasūtranibandha* of Bhaṭṭa Vādīndra (13th century A.D.) along with the *Sūtravyākhyā* portion of this Nibandha extending up to the end of the first āhnika of the ninth chapter and the last two chapters of a *Vṛtti* written under Vallālasena of Bengal. These along with the digests and commentaries thereon offer all the Vaiśeṣika materials that we have. But it is now very difficult to distinguish the contributions of Kaṇāda from the later additions. The most intricate discussions on duality, chemical action and derivative disjunction that harass a student of the Vaiśeṣika system are later developments.

In the first chapter we get an account of all the categories that inhere in substances. There also the first daily lesson gives the properties of those in which universals (jāti) inhere. while the second examines the universals as well as particularity (viśeṣa).

The second chapter examines the five bhūtas (physical substances), space and time. The first lesson presents the bhūtas and the second the rest.

The third chapter deals with soul (ātman) and mind (manas) respectively in its first and second lessons.

The fourth chapter gives an account of the physical body (śarīra) and its accessories (tad-upayogin). The accessories are treated in the first lesson while the body is examined in the second.

Action is examined in the fifth chapter. The first lesson gives the physical actions (śārīra karman) and the second concerns itself with mental ones (mānasa karman).

The sixth chapter discusses the Vedic dharma, dānadharma and āśramadharma forming the subject-matter of its lessons.

The seventh chapter concerns itself with qualities (guṇas) and inherence (samavāya). The first lesson examines qualities not depending on knowledge and the second examines the other qualities along with inherence.

The eighth chapter discusses perception (pratyakṣa) in its indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka) aspects.

The ninth chapter examines particular cognitions.

And the tenth and last chapter deals with inference (anumāna) and its sub-divisions.

In Kaṇāda's view the objective world has a real existence independent of the cogniser. The latter may or may not cognise them but the reals called padārthas (literal meaning of the terms, i.e., categories) exist all the same. The number of these categories was possibly not fixed by the sage himself and it gave an opportunity to the later Vaiśeṣikas to add new items to the list. The sūtra (I.i. 4) in Śankaramiśra's version counting six categories is an interpolation. We first find Praśastapāda to count six categories—dravya (substance), guṇa (quality), karman (action), sāmānya (universals), viśeṣa (particularity) and samavāya (inherence). Of these the first three are important and are technically called arthas as they form the objects of our desire (arthyamāṇa) and produce merit and demerit. The last three though eternal have no moral value. Abhāva (negation) has been examined by Kaṇāda. Udayana recognises it as a distinct Vaiśeṣika category. Candramati, an earlier author, has śakti (potency), aśakti (non-potency), sāmānya-viśesa (intermediate universals)

and abhāva in addition to the six mentioned by Praśastapāda.

Among the Vaiśeṣika categories, substance is that which possesses qualities and actions and is the material cause of effects. There are nine substances, earth, water, light, air, ākāśa, time, space, soul and mind. Of these the first four are composed of eternal and indivisible aṇus (generally called atoms). The atomic theory of Kaṇāda has exercised great influence on Indian thought. Some Buddhists, Ājīvikas, Jainas, Naiyāyikas, the Āyurvedins and others accept it. They, however, differ from the Vaiśeṣikas as well as from one another on various points. The Anu-theory is deep rooted in Indian thought. And the view that it has been borrowed from the Greeks is not probable.

Minds are many, eternal and have the minutest dimension while the remaining four are ubiquitous and eternal. Among the ubiquitous substances souls are many while the rest are not so. A soul may be bound or liberated. When liberated, it is totally free from its specific qualities (Vaiśeṣika-guṇas) like happiness, misery, cognition, etc.

Guṇa (quality) inheres in substance. It does not possess another guṇa. It is not by itself the cause of conjunction and disjunction. Kaṇāda counts seventeen guas, e.g. colour (rūpa), taste (rasa), odour (gandha), touch (sparśa), number (saṁkhyā), measure (parimāṇa), separation (pṛthaktva), conjunction (samyoga), disjunction (vibhāga), distance (paratva), proximity (aparatva), cognition (buddhi), pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha), desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa) and volitional effort (prayatna).

Action (karman) is devoid of guṇa. It cannot inhere in more than one object. It inheres in substance alone and is an independent cause of conjunction and disjunction. It is of five kinds—upward movement (utkṣepaṇa),

downward movement (apakṣepaṇa), contraction (ākuñcana), expansion (prasāraṇa) and movement (gamana) in general.

Universal (sāmānya) and particularity (viśeṣa) are the two categories relative to the notions (of inclusion and exclusion).

Inherence(samavāya) is the cause of the notion of substratum and substrate between the cause and the effect (etc.).

Post-Kaṇāda speculation has added new items to the lists and amended the definitions also.

Kaṇāda's treatise is called *Vaiśeṣikadarśana*. The term Viśeṣa here has differently been interpreted. It is said that it is the fifth category of Kaṇāda, accepted in no other school. Hence it has been taken as the distinctive feature of the Śāstra. Durvekamiśra is of the opinion that the six categories together form the distinguishing mark of the Śāśtra or the Śāśtra itself is called Viśeṣa since it distinguishes itself from other Śāśtras by propounding the knowledge of the six categories. Ui quotes a different explanation from Ci-tsan's (549-623 A.D.) commentary on the *Śataśāstra* of Deva. He says : "Vaiśeṣika, the name of the Śāstra, means superior or excellent and distinguished (or different). The origin of the name is in fact that the system is distinguished from and superior to the Sāṁkhya."[1]

The universe was fairly well known at the time of Kaṇāda. Doubts were entertained with regard to many items while there were many more not known at all. Kaṇāda's scheme to know and explain things was to analyse and divide them into clear categories. He subdivided these categories when such sub-division was possible. Here comparison and contrast was his chief aid. He believed that in order to attain the *summum bonum* of

1. *Vaiśeṣika Philosophy*, Introduction, p. 4.

life one must know the things properly. He, therefore, broadly distinguished the known (dṛṣṭa) from what was unknown and unexplained (adṛṣṭa). His endeavour was to minimise the scope of the latter and he was successful in his effort to a great extent. He could not, like the Vedāntins, present one single principle which would include the entire universe. He has, however, introduced a method of enquiry based on strong common sense which accepts the empirical world as real. In his presentation of the asatkāryavāda theory, a Vaiśeṣika says that the effect cannot exist before it is produced by the causes. This goes against the satkāryavāda theory of the Sāṁkhyas which holds that the effect is already present in its material cause and the production of the effect is nothing but appearance of what is hidden in the material cause. It is true that scientific investigations in later ages have disproved some of Kaṇāda's theories and successfully explained things which he left as adṛṣṭa-kārita, caused by unknown agents. Kaṇāda should, however, be remembered as one of the highest minds humanity has produced for scientific investigation of truth and morality.

Changes are taking place in the scientific fields. Kaṇāda's theory of material character of light was so long neglected by the scientists. But the great scientist, Sir C. V. Raman, has in his latest publication established its material character.

The sūtras of Kaṇāda along with the Vaiśeṣika tenets have been used in the works of almost all the philosophical schools. No other work or system is found to exert similar influence upon other schools.

The Jainas, both the Digambaras and the Śvetāmbaras, have given a distinct place of honour to Kaṇāda and his system. The Trairāśika sect of the Jainas started by Rohagupta (A. D. 17) adopted the theory of the six categories and as such was called Ṣaḍulūka. The expression

Ulūka in the epithet seems to suggest that he became a follower of Kaṇāda. The account of Rohagupta's teachings given in the *Viśeṣāvaśvakabhāṣya* of Jinabhadragaṇi shows that he accepted the six categories of the Vaiśeṣikas and sub-divided substance into nine, qualities into seventeen, action into five and generality into two after the sūtras of Kaṇāda. The *Nandisūtra* along with the *Anuyogadvārasūtra* mentions the Vaiśeṣikaśāstra as a false text. Quotations from and references to numerous Vaiśeṣika authors are found in Jaina philosophical works. This throws a flood of light on the history of Kaṇāda's system. The *Tattvārthasūtra* of Umāsvāti has some expressions borrowed from the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana* Special mention can be made of the *Dvādaśāranayacakraṭīkā* of Siṁhasuri, *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* of Vādirāja, *Siddhiviniścayaṭīkā* of Anantavīrya and the *Syādvādaratnākara* of Devasuri in which influence of the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana* is manifest.

The Buddhists of the schools of Nāgārjuna and Maitreyanātha accepted the Vaiśeṣikas as their chief opponents. The Vaiśeṣika is a staunch realist. He accepts matter in its atomic as well as composite forms. The Buddhists refute both these for the establishment of the theory of universal flux or pure idealism Some passages in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* which mentions Kaṇāda resemble Vaiśeṣika expressions. Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvali* refers to the system of Ulūka. The *Kalpanāmanditikā* or *Sūtrālaṅkāra* by Kumāralāta, Aśvaghoṣa's junior contemporary, refutes the theory of the Vaiśeṣikas. Dignāga accepts the two means of cognition, three aspects of the probans and three fallacies of the Vaiśeṣikas while his predecessors followed the Nyāya scheme of four means of cognition, five aspects of the probans and five fallacies.

The two schools of Pūrvamimāṁsā have great similarity with the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana*. The Bhāṭṭas accept five categories, substance, quality, action, universal and

negation. They add sound and darkness to the Vaiśeṣika list of nine substances. They accept all the seventeen qualities counted by Kaṇāda, adding seven more to make the number twenty-four, though in partial disagreement with the later Vaiśeṣikas in counting the new ones. The Bhāṭṭa's view on action and negation is similar to that of the Vaiśeṣikas.

The Prābhākaras also agree with the Vaiśeṣika and accept substance, quality, action, genus and inherence, but add number, similarity and potency to the Vaiśeṣika list of padārthas. They are one with Kaṇāda on the sub-division of substances. In the sub-division of guṇas, they omit number only from Kaṇāda's list and add seven more. Genus is of two kinds here just as in the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana*. The great Mīmāṁsā teachers, including Prabhākara and Śālikanātha have used Vaiśeṣikasūtras and tenets in their works. And Śālikanātha wrote a commentary on the *Padārthadharmasaṁgraha* of Praśastapāda.

The *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarayaṇa presupposes the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana*. Śaṅkara in the *Śārirakabhāṣya* and the Bhāṣyas on the Upaniṣads refers to and refutes the Vaiśeṣika position. So do other commentators and sub-commentators on the *Brahmasūtra* Śrīharṣa and Citsukha, among others, took great pains to refute the Vaiśeṣikas.

The *Saṁkhyasūtra* refers to the Vaiśeṣika by name. The *Yuktidīpikā* on the *Saṁkhyakārikā* offers some important material on the Vaiśeṣika system.

The system of Akṣapāda has many things in common with the *Vaiśeṣikadarśana*. The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika are called kindred sciences—*samāna-tantras*. Their relation is as old as the systems themselves. The *Nyayabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana and the *Nyāyavārtika* of Uddyotakara show marked partiality for the Vaiśeṣika views. They quote *Vaiśeṣikasūtras* and occasionally explain them. The

relation between the two systems deepened and eventually they merged into a single school.

Literary works and medical treatises also evince occasional influence of the Vaiśeṣika. From the above it is clear that Kaṇāda's system loomed large in the thought-ferment of ancient India and exercised wide influence and engaged the primary attention of other schoolmen who had either to adopt the concepts of Kaṇāda or take the trouble of refuting them.

GAUTAMA

Anantalal Thakur

The *Nyāyasūtras*, the basis of the six systems of Indian philosophy, have been attributed to Akṣapāda Gautama. Akṣapāda seems to be the author's personal name, while 'Gautama' shows that he belonged to the family (gotra) of the sage Gotama. There were several ṛṣis with the name Gotama after one of whom is named a noble family of seers. Attempts have been made to identify the author of the *Nyāyasūtras* with one or the other of them. The problem, however, has not been solved.

Akṣapāda was of course the first authority to systematise the Nyāyaśāstra and set it forth in sūtras. But the Śāstra must have originated much earlier. We hear of philosophical and logical disputes in sacrificial assemblies, royal courts and hermitages in the *Mahābhārata* and elsewhere. The debates in the Rājasūya and Aśvamedha sacrifices, the dialogue between Sulabhā and Janaka[1], the debate between Aṣṭāvakra and Vandin[2] and the dialogue between Suvarcalā and Śvetaketu[3] show that debates were in vogue and were conducted according to established rules. The *Mahābhārata*[4] knew of several Nyāya texts by the different debators. Nārada is said to have been an adept in ascertaining the merits and defects of the five-membered syllogism.[5] The *Mahābhāratā* further refers to Vāda (debate),[6] Jalpa (disputation) and Vitaṇḍā

1 *Mahābhārata*, 12. 220
2 „ 3. 132-35
3 „ 12. 220
4 „ 12. 210.22
5 „ 2. 5.5
6 „ 3. 112,6, 15-16, etc.

(destructive argumentation),[1] the four pramāṇas (sources of knowledge), nigraha (vulnerable points)[2] and pretyabhāva (after life).[3]

About the origin of the Logical science, which is called Ānvīkṣikī the *Mahābhārata*[4] says that Brahmā wrote a work consisting of one lac chapters in which the Vedas, Ānvīkṣikī Vārtā (commercial and economic sciences), Daṇḍanīti (administrative and judicial science) were included.[5] Manu also recommends these four Śāstras as indispensable for a prince. The followers of Manu, reports Kauṭalya, included Ānvīkṣikī in the Vedas while Kauṭalya himself accepts the four traditional vidyās as independent ones. The *Gautamadharmaśāstra,*[6] the *Rāmāyaṇa*[7] and the *Mahābhārata*[8] also use the term in the sense of Logical science.

But while dividing Ānvīkṣikī Kauṭalya counts only three varieties, i.e. Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. It has raised doubts as to whether Nyāyavidyā came into existence before Kauṭalya. It has been suggested on the basis of the *Harivaṁśa*[9] that the Lokāyataśāstra of Kauṭalya includes Nyāyavidyā. But the yoga of Kauṭalya could better be taken as identical with Nyāya because in later texts, especially of the Jainas, Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika or both of them are meant by the term yoga. Vātsyāyana also attributes the asatkāryavāda view to the yogas.[10] It goes against the satkāryavāda theory of the Pātañjala-yogaśāstra which used to be included in Sāṁkhya as Seśvarasāṁkhya. The followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school were called 'yogas' because of their affiliation to

---

1 *Ibid.*, 2. 37. 3-4
2 „ 12. 260
3 „ 7. 135.31
4 „ 12.59
5 „ 7.47
6 11
7 2, 100.30
8 12. 180.47
9 Bhaviṣya, 67.30
10 *Nyāyabhāṣya*, 1.1.29

the Pāśupata Yogaśāstra as already referred to. Kauṭalya's eloquent praise of the science of Ānvīkṣikī would be meaningless if Nyāyavidyā were left out. Kauṭalya says :

"Dharma and Adharma are to be known from the Vedas, gain and loss from the Vārtāśāstra, good policy and the bad one from the science of politics. The Ānvīkṣikī examines the strength or weakness of these on the basis of reasoning and so it is of great help to men. It settles man's judgments in prosperity as well as in adversity and brings efficiency in knowledge, speech and action.

It is a light unto all the sciences, an instrument in all the performances and a basis of all the dharmas.

pradīpaḥ sarvaśāstrāṇām upāyaḥ sarvakarmāṇām
āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṁ śaśvad ānvīkṣikī matā

It is to be noted that Vātsyāyana, who is sometimes identified with Kauṭalya, has reproduced the three feet of the verse mentioning the fact that they are taken from the Vidyoddeśa section of the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭalya.

Śaṅkarācārya takes Vākovākya of the *Chāndogyopaniṣat*[1] in the sense of the Nyāyaśāstra. Kātyāyana[2] recommends daily recitation of the Vākovākya. Gautama[3] speaks of the necessity of its knowledge for a Brāhmaṇa.

The Nyāyaśāstra was called Hetuvidyā or Hetuśāstra and we hear of the Haitukas who followed it. Tarkavidyā and Vādavidyā are the other names applied to it.[4]

---

1 7.1.2 2 Sam. 14.2 3 Sam. 8

4 Vide *Manu* 6.50 etc., *Mahābhārata*, 12.180.47 etc., *Skandapurāṇa*, *Kālikā* 17, *Gautamadharmasūtra* 1, *Rāmāyaṇa* 1.12.23, 7.53.15. *Yājñavalkyasaṁhitā*, 3.292

But the name Nyāyavidyā and Nyāyaśāstra came to be generally used.[1]

The term Nyāya means a syllogistic reasoning, the end of which is the attainment of the desired conclusion with the help of the four means of knowledge and the hetu qualified by the requisite attributes. The syllogistic reasoning forms the central point of the Śāstra.

In spite of the close relation of the science of Gautama with the Vedas and other Śāstras, we sometimes come across criticism of it and its founder. The Nyāya along with the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṁkhya is called a tāmasa (dark) Sāstra, propounded to delude the people.[2] The *Mahābhārata*[3] and the *Gandharvatantra* speak of the birth of Gautama as a jackal as a result of his attachment to the Nyāyaśāstra. The *Mahābhārata*[4] again considers one "burnt with the tarkaśāstra" as unfit to receive a good Śāstra. The *Skandapurāṇa*[5] refers to the curse by the sages on Gautama and its remedy. The *Rāmāyaṇa*[6] and the *Manusaṁhitā*[7] also refer to bad logicians. The *Parāśaropapurāṇa* detects some anti-Vedic portions in the works of Kaṇāda and Gotama and asks for their rejection. All these are due to the advent of different kinds of logical treatises, some of which must have been antagonistic to the Vedic culture. The *Mahābhārata*[8] clearly states that there were many works on Nyāya written by different debators. One should follow only those that are supported by reason, scripture and established usage.

As we have already seen, Gautama's Śāstra was held in high esteem. We may add further that the Nyāyaśāstra has been counted among the Vidyāsthānas by the

---

1 *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.1.1.
2 *Padmapurāṇa* Uttara, 263
3 12. 180
4 12. 266
5 Kālikākhaṇḍa, 7
6 2. 100
7 2.2
8 12.21.22

Yājñavalkyasaṁhitā[1], *Padmapurāṇa* and *Viṣṇupurāṇa*.[2] The *Subālopaniṣad*, the *Bhāgavatamahāpurāṇa*[3] and others accept it as authoritative and it has always been counted as one of the āstika-darśanas.

The Nyāya works themselves give some details about the sage. Vātsyāyana says that he wrote the *Nyāyabhāṣya* on the sūtras which dawned upon the sage Akṣapāda. At one place Vātsyāyana[4] refers to the style of the *Nyāyasūtras* saying that the sage does not always state the positions of the parties but keeps one side to be understood. According to Uddyotakara, the purpose of writing the Śāstra was to bring tranquillity to the world. At the conclusion of each chapter of his Vārtika, Uddyotakara gives in verse the subject-matter discussed in it. It served as a guide to Vācaspati I in dividing the sūtras into prakaraṇas. Vācaspati I considers the sage as qualified by the highest piety, knowlegde, non-attachment and supernatural powers. He is again called 'Tāyin'-receptacle of purity of speech and the starting-point of the Śāstraic tradition that keep up the torch of the true knowlegde burning for ever. Jayanta extols the sayings of the sage Akṣapāda as the receptacle of the many gems, purified by praises from Lord Śiva. The Nyāyaśāstra, according to Jayanta, is a big shady tree offering bunches of fruits, from which compact nectar-like juice flows in abundance. He further adds that Akṣapāda received respect from many sages, satisfied the Great Lord by dint of the purity of speech, deep on account of the utterance of logical truths in a debate and received a liberal boon from Him just like Arjuna who satisfied the same Lord in the form of a Kirāta in a duel.

---

1 1.3
2 3.6
3 1.3.2
4 2. 2.27

Bhaṭṭa Vāgīśvara also records the fact that the sage was praised by Lord Śiva.

In later ages the Nyāyaśāstra was received as the Pramāṇaśāstra along with the sciences of the Pada (i.e. Grammar) and the Vākya (i.e. Mīmāṁsā) and a knowlegde of the three together constituted the high watermark of Indian scholarship.

The *Nyāyasūtras* are divided into five chapters of two daily lessons (āhnikas) each. The first āhnika of the first chapter counts the sixteen Nyāya categories, viz., sources of knowlegde (pramāṇa), objects of knowledge (prameya), doubt (saṁśaya), purpose (prayojana), illustrative instance (dṛṣṭānta), accepted tenet (siddhānta), members of a syllogism (avayava), argumentation (tarka), ascertainment (nirṇaya), debate (vāda), disputation (jalpa), destructive criticism (vitaṇḍā), fallacy (hetvābhāsa), quibble (chala), futile rejoinder (jāti) and points of defeat (nigrahasthāna). It then divides and defines the first nine items, which have a special bearing on epistemology and logic. The second lesson similarly divides and defines the other seven categories which are associated with debates and disputations. Quibbles find their examination along with their classification and definition.

The first lesson of the second chapter examines doubt and the four sources of knowledge, viz., perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda) along with composite substances and time. The second lesson shows the inclusion of other pramāṇas in the recognised ones with detailed discussion on verbal testimony. The first lesson of the third chapter examines the first four objects of knowledge, i. e., soul (ātman), body (śarīra), sense-organs (indriyas) and objects of senses (artha), while the second lesson examines intellect (buddhi) and mind (manas) and adds a discussion on

the association of the soul with specific bodies due to one's merits and demerits. The first lesson of the fourth chapter examines endeavour (pravṛtti), rebirth (pretya-bhāva), result (phala), sorrow (duḥkha) and salvation (apavarga) along with the examination of the eight theories (prāvādukavādas) regarding creation of the entities. The second lesson examines composite bodies, the impartite character of the ultimate particles (paramāṇus), reconsiders the refutation of eternal objects and shows the way to enhancement and preservation of true knowledge. The fifth chapter in its two lessons subdivides and defines the last two categories, i. e. jāti and nigrahasthāna respectively.

The sūtras of Akṣapāda are better preserved than those of Kaṇāda. We follow the evolution of the Śāstra through the great commentaries, i. e. the *Nyāyabhāṣya* of Vātsyāyana Pakṣilasvāmin, *Nyāyavārtika* of Uddyotakara, *Tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati I and the *Tātparyapariśuddhi* of Udayana, together called the *Nyāyacaturgranthikā*. The later *vṛttis* on the sūtras lead to the results of subsequent investigations. The study of the Nyāya-darśana based on the *Caturgranthikā* lost its former importance under the new logic (navyanyāya). Interest in the sūtras, however, was alive. They were studied with the help of the *vṛttis* just mentioned.

Vācaspatimiśra I considered it necessary to edit critically the *Nyāyasūtras*. The *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* (898 Śaka) is the result of his enquiry in this direction. Presumably he consulted commentaries and manuscripts. This concordance accepts 528 sūtras as genuine and divides them into 84 prakaraṇas (sections). The words and syllables in the critical text number 1796 and 8385 respectively. Vācaspati II in the 15th century A. D. wrote the *Nyāya-tattvāloka*, an elaborate commentary on the *Nyāya-*

sūtras and edited the sūtra text again. He differs here and there in the readings of the sūtras from Vācaspati I and the total number of sūtras in his text became 531. Keśavamiśra Tarkācārya in his *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśa* accepts 522 sūtras only.[1]

The *Nyāyasūtras* analyse only those categories which have a bearing on the attainment of Niḥśreyas (the highest good). The Niḥśreyas is of two kinds—the higher and the lower ones. The former is attained through the true knowledge of the prameyas, while the lower one is achieved through that of the pramāṇas, etc. The Śāstra, therefore, has a twofold scope. It is a mokṣa-śāstra and at the same time an aid to the understanding of the other Śāstras. The fourteen categories, Doubt etc., constitute the special province of the Nyāyaśāstra. Without them the Nyāya would be a spiritual discipline just like the Upaniṣads. But the history of Indian logic shows that in the face of the anti-spiritual Buddhist nyāya, the orthodox authors like Vātsyāyana, Uddyotakara, Vācaspati I and Udayana could not but lay emphasis on the spiritual side of the Śāstra. When the Buddhists lost ground under the invasion of the Muslims, the Navya-nyāya or neo-logic left God and spirit to themselves and poured all its attention on the merely intellectual side of the pramāṇas. But the basic system as set forth in the sūtras of Akṣāpada is comprehensive in character and includes the spiritual and empirical considerations alike. This was, as we have seen above, recognised by Kauṭalya.

A correct knowledge of the categories leads to the annihilation of false knowledge (mithyājñāna), whereupon

1 The *Nyāyatattvāloka* and the *Gautamīyasūtraprakāśa* are available in manuscripts. They deserve to be edited and published.

are removed the doṣas (defects, i. e. attachment, aversion and delusion). The removal of the defects leads to the removal of pravṛtti (activity), which again removes rebirth (janma). Rebirth being removed, one is freed from duḥkha (misery) and consequently salvation (apavarga) is attained. Most of the schools of Indian philosophy start with a consideration of the removal of misery and prescribe the way for its attainment. It is interesting to note that the process enunciated by Akṣapāda is similar to the theory of nidānas of the Buddhists, the difference being that Akṣapāda enumerates five steps whereas the Buddha gives twelve.

The sources of knowledge, according to Akṣapāda, are four—perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna) and verbal testimony (śabda). Perception is a knowledge, uncontradicted and determinate in character, not associated with names and arising out of contact of the sense-organ with its object. Inference presupposes perception and is of three kinds—from cause to effect (pūrvavat), from effect to cause (śeṣavat) and from general characteristics (sāmānya) to dṛṣṭa. Analogy leads to the knowledge of the unknown from similarity with the known. Śabda leads to knowledge from the testimony of reliable authority. It is of two kinds—commonly experienced and outside the scope of common experience.

In its later history, the Nyāya took more interest in the study of the pramāṇas (proofs), anumāna (inference) receiving more prominence. But Akṣapāda himself has attached importance to the objects of knowledge (prameyas) and devoted two chapters to their examination. Objects of knowledge are twelve in number—soul (ātman), body (śarīra), sense-organ (indriya), sense-object (artha), intellect (buddhi), mind (manas), endeavour (pravṛtti),

defect (doṣa), rebirth (pretyabhāva), enjoyment of the fruits of action (phala), sorrow (duḥkha) and salvation (apavarga). Of these, the first and the last are essential. The rest are only hindrances to the soul's reaching the state of salvation.

The soul has the qualities of desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and knowledge as its distinguishing marks. The body is the receptacle of effort, sense-organs and sense-objects. The olfactory, gustatory, ocular, tactile and auditory senses arise out of the elements and these elements are earth, water, tejas, air and ākāśa having smell, taste, colour, touch and sound for the objects of the senses respectively. Buddhi, upalabdhi and jñāna are synonymous and stand for cognition. Non-production of simultaneous cognitions warrants the supposition of the mind. Effort (pravṛtti) is of three kinds—those of speech, mind and body. The defects (doṣas) are those that lead to activity. Rebirth (pretyabhāva) is the association with a fresh set of body, senses, etc., after dissociation from another set. Phala is that which arises from effort and doṣas. All the objects of knowledge beginning from body and ending with phala cause suffering and are thus called misery. The ultimate cessation of suffering is called emancipation (apavarga).

Thus, according to Vātsyāyana and his followers, the final state of emancipation is not a positive one of enjoyment of bliss. However, Bhāsarvajña of Kashmir, a Nyāya philosopher, who has made certain definite departures, accepts Mokṣa as a blissful state. Some other authorities including the author of the *Saṅkṣepaśaṅkaravijaya* and Kumārila hold that Akṣapāda accepted mokṣa as a state of ānanda.

Doubt (saṁśaya) is the seeking of a deciding factor when the knowledge of common or uncommon charac-

teristics, mutual discrepancy (vipratipatti) or irregularity in perception or non-perception blocks the way of cognition. Purpose (prayojana) is that for which one applies oneself to activity. Illustrative instance (dṛṣṭānta) is that of which both the learned and the novice are equally aware. An accepted tenet (siddhānta) is restricted by the texts, the substratum or by mere 'taking for granted'. It is of four kinds according to the acceptance of (a) all the texts, (b) of the self-same text (along with the kindred text, if any), (c) of a wider substratum from which corollaries follow, and (d) of taking the thesis of the opponent for granted with a view to showing incongruity in it. Among them the tenet taken as true in one's own text and not contradicted by any other text is called sarva-tantra-siddhānta. One accepted in a certain school (and by its kindred school, if any) but not accepted by others is a prati-tantra-siddhānta. A tenet which, when proved, proves other corollaries is adhikaraṇa-siddhānta. A tenet accepted before examination with a view to ultimate refutation is called abhyupagama-siddhānta.

Pratijñā (thesis), hetu (reason), udāharaṇa (example) upanaya (analogue), and nigamana (conclusion) are the members (avayava) of a syllogism.

The statement of what is to be proved is called pratijñā. A hetu proves the thesis on the basis of similarity or dissimilarity with the example. An example may be positive or negative. A positive one is an illustrative instance (dṛṣṭānta) having the characteristics of the major term. A negative example is an illustrative instance having the opposite characteristics of the major term. An upanaya (analogue) is guided by the example and shows a connection between the major and minor terms. It is prefixed by the expressions 'like that' or 'unlike that' according to the positive or negative

character of the hetu. The nigamana (conclusion) is the repetition of the thesis after a statement of the 'hetu'.

The syllogism of Akṣapāda consisting of five members has the advantage of combining together induction and deduction while the Aristotelian syllogism gives deduction alone. This disproves the supposition of Aristotle's influence on Akṣapāda's nyāya-vākya.

A tarka (argumentation) is a conjecture (ūha) for the attainment of true knowledge on the basis of the plausibility of either of the two contradictory reasons in a case where the essence is not known. Nirṇaya is the ascertainment of truth (in a case of tarka) with the help of the thesis and anti-thesis after doubt.

Debate and disputation are intimately connected in Akṣapāda's treatise. His point of view is that not only a truth is to be discovered but it should also be demonstrated adequately to convince others. It is here that epistemology and logic join hands with debate.

Of the three kinds of philosophical discussions a debate (vāda) is a syllogistic discourse between two contending parties who do not transgress the limits of their own accepted tenets, having the means of knowledge and argumentation for support and refutation. The same becomes a jalpa (disputation) when quibble (chala), futile rejoinder (jāti) and points of defeat (nigrahasthāna) also serve as the means of refutation. A jalpa becomes vitaṇḍā (destructive criticism) where the thesis of the opponent is not explicitly stated.

There are five members in a syllogistic argument and as such there is possibility of fallacies in each of the members. But as every fallacy is casually linked up with the hetu, the fallacies of reason (hetvābhāsa) alone have been dealt with in the Śāstra. They are five in number—*savya-*

bhicāra (inconclusive), *Viruddha* (contradictory), *prakaraṇasama* (of contradicted reason), *sādhyasama* (of unproved reason) and *Kālātīta* (mistimed).

Savyabhicāra is the fallacy of the reason which is inconstant, i. e. present alike in pakṣa (subject, in which the presence of the probandum is uncertain), sapakṣa (kindred instance, in which the presence of the probandum is certain) and Vipakṣa (contrary instance lacking the probandum). In a case of Viruddha fallacy, the reason contradicts the proposition to be established. In prakaraṇasama the hetu supposed to lead to the ascertainment is itself defective. In the later Nyāya literature the defect has been explained as having an equally strong contradictory hetu. When the hetu itself requires to be proved just like the sādhya (probandum), the resulting fallacy is called sādhyasama. Lastiy, when a hetu, of which the time is past, is adduced, the consequent fallacy is called kālātīta.

Rebutting the thesis of the proponent by taking recourse to an alternative meaning of a term is called chala (quibble). It is of three kinds : vākchala (verbal quibble), sāmānychala (generic quibble) and upacārachala (figurative quibble). In vākchala, the opponent refutes a plain statement by pointing to an alternative meaning never intended by the proponent. In sāmānyachala a statement with regard to a single individual is extended to cover the whole class. In an upacārachala the opponent takes the figurative expression of the proponent in plain literal sense.

A jāti (futile rejoinder) is a refutation on the basis of similarity and dissimilarity. A nigrahasthāna is a point involving either non-comprehension or wrong comprehension that results in the defeat of a party.

The above bare outline can but give a scanty idea about the contribution of Akṣapāda to Indian thought.

He has exerted much influence on all the schools of Indian philosophy. The syllogistic reasoning of Akṣapāda has generally been accepted as the means of proving one's own thesis. The number of the sources of knowledge is sometimes enhanced or diminished. But anumāna assumed more importance elsewhere as in the Nyāya system. There also the predominance of the hetu is accepted on all hands. The number of its essential characteristics was reduced to three from four or five. The number of fallacies also came to three as a consequence. The number of members of a syllogism was sometimes raised to ten and again reduced to three. But all these were possible when the basis was supplied by Akṣapāda. The Nyāya has constructed a terminology of precise connotation which came to be the property of all the Śāstras. The antagonists of the Nyāya also had to use the Nyāya method and the Nyāya terms to refute its position.

The Buddhists had their Vāda treatises which followed the general scheme of Akṣapāda and had hardly any difference in counting the categories and their definitions. Gradually they assumed the role of the chief antagonists of the Nyāya realism and Dignāga and his followers ceased to be influenced by Akṣapāda's treatise. The rivalry between the Brāhmanical and Buddhist logic spread over a long period contributed much to the growth of both of them. Each scholar refuted the position of his opponent in the rival school just to be refuted by another who followed his adversary. This process went on till the Muslim invasion of eastern India.

The Jainas continued to derive inspiration from the system of Akṣapāda in the development of their own logic.

The Vaiśeṣikas are close associates of the Naiyāyikas. The Vaiśeṣika epistemology was much improved on

the basis of that of the Nyāya. The acceptance of abhāva as a separate category in the Vaiśeṣika school is due to the Nyāya influence.

The epistemology and logic of the Mīmāṁsā, Sāṁkhya and Yoga also show direct or indirect influence of the Nyāya.

On the other hand, the sūtras of Akṣapāda show Sāṁkhya, Mīmāṁsā and Buddhist influences. In many of the sections of the *Nyāyadarśana*, the pūrvapakṣa (thesis to be refuted) came from them. They, however, do not exactly correspond with the topics available in current texts of the systems. Thus the Śūnyavāda as refuted in the *Nyāyadarśana* is considerably different from that of Nāgārjuna and Maitreyanātha.

It is interesting to note that the early Nyāya literature takes no note of Jainism. Caraka in his medical compendium treats many of the Nyāya categories.

The later development of the Śastra shows that some topics casually hinted at or not touched at all assumed great importance in the course of its development. We may cite the instances of the subject of theism and that of universal concomitance (Vyāptivāda). According to Vātsyāyana, God has been introduced in the Śāstra only to point out to a view prevalent at the time of Akṣapāda. In Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali*, however, theism attained supreme importance. The Vyāptivāda is entirely a later addition though it happens to be an indispensable branch of new logic (Navya-nyāya). On the other hand, jāti and nigrahasthāna lost their former importance, though they received detailed treatment at the hands of Vardhamāna Upādhyāya.

The propriety of the introduction of chala, jāti and nigrahasthāna in a spiritual science was questioned

quite early. Akṣapāda himself justified it on the ground that these served to protect the Nyāya tenets from unmerited attacks just as a thorny fence protects the seedlings from the grazing animals.

Akṣapāda came at a time when the Nyāya speculations attained comparative maturity. But the case is otherwise in the Vaiśeṣika system as the pre-Kaṇāda Vaiśeṣika speculations are very meagre. Again, the Vaiśeṣika system shows several breaks in its history while the Nyāya presents an unbroken tradition. Scholars from different parts of the country studied it and contributed to its development. But Mithilā surpasses the rest in its continued devotion and volume of contribution to the Śāstra throughout its history.

The Nyāyaśāstra reached beyond the borders of India. We hear of a reference to Gautama, the debator, in the *Khorda Avesta*.[1] Again, manuscripts of new logic in Arakanese characters are extant. Buddhist logic, which is nothing but a branch of the Brahmanic stream, crossed the northern borders of India and reached Tibet and China to be preserved, studied and commented upon by numerous scholars. In the modern times, Indian logic has become a subject of interest among European and American scholars also.

Induction was invented and logic came to be treated as the science of sciences and art of arts in quite recent times in the West. As a result all the sciences began to thrive by leaps and bounds. Induction in India, however, though known from the early times, failed to exert similar influence on the positive sciences in spite of Kauṭalya's awareness of its comprehensive character.

---

1 Yasht 13.

JAIMINI

G. V. Devasthali

About Jaimini, the well-known propounder of one of the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy, almost nothing is known except his name; and such a plethora of works has been traditionally associated with the name Jaimini that it is highly difficult, if not altogether impossible, to arrive at a definite identity of Jaimini, the philosopher-author of the *Mīmāṁsā Darśana*. Besides the *Vedic Saṁhitā* and the *Brāhmaṇa* named after him, Jaimini has a *Śrautasūtra*, a *Gṛhyasūtra*, a redaction of the *Mahābhārata*, and even a small work on astrology bearing the name *Jaiminīya Saṁhitā* assigned to him.

There must have been more authors than one bearing the same name, Jaimini. Jaimini associated with the *Saṁhitā* and the *Brāhmaṇa* is in all probability different from the reputed author of the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* and also from that of the astrological work. Nor can he be identified with the author of the *Śrautasūtra* and the *Gṛhyasūtra* apparently named after him. Even in the field of philosophy, the author of the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* is not the only Jaimini. That there must have been at least one more Jaimini, more ancient than our author, is shown by the fact that in the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*,[1] the *prima facie* view has been ascribed to a Jaimini who evidently must be different from the author of the whole work, obviously the upholder of the conclusive (Siddhānta) view.

The existence of at least one Jaimini, different from the author of the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*, is shown also by

---

1 6.3.4

the fact that commenting on the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*[1], Śabara refers to Jaimini without using the honorific title ācārya as he has done in all other places. The *Brahmasūtra* notices several views of Jaimini, not all of which can be traced in the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*. This would indicate that if these references are to the same Jaimini, then Jaimini must have composed some more work or works besides the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* and further that he must have held views on even Vedānta topics. No Vedānta work of Jaimini, however, has been discovered so far. The safest conclusion under these circumstances would, therefore, be that Jaimini, the philosopher, held specific views on topics concerning both the Mīmāṁsās, but had couched only the former in his well-known *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*.

The only other detail that legend has conveyed to us about Jaimini is his death caused by a wild elephant. But for this, not even a legendary account of the life of this great thinker has come down to us.

Jaimini is quite reticent about the doctrines of Buddhism. No Mīmāṁsaka can be said to have established his view unless he smashes the Buddhistic doctrine, so much so that silence on the part of Jaimini about it can only be understood as indicating the absence of that doctrine in any form in his time. Secondly, Jaimini is separated from Śabara, his commentator, by at least a few centuries ; and Śabara is a younger contemporary of Patañjali as is indicated by the absence of reference to him by the former. Jaimini must therefore have flourished about 500 B.C.

The *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* appears to touch the *Nirukta* at three different places. The definitions of nāma (name) and ākhyāta (verb) in both are almost identical. Similarly the discussion regarding the arthavattva (meaningfulness)

1 6.3.1 and 4

or otherwise of the mantras in both runs on quite parallel lines, agreeing almost fully in the *prima facie* arguments, their refutation and the final view. The views regarding the devatās are also parallel in both. But neither can be said to be the borrower. This would show that both the works must have taken these ideas from some common source. These facts, coupled with a few more circumstances, mainly negative, can be said to lead to the conclusion that Jaimini must be assigned to a date not later than at least 500 B.C., and very probably must have flourished quite earlier in the period of the *Kalpasūtras* with which the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* shows great affinity.

The work itself contains about 3000 sūtras discussing duty (dharma and related details) in about a thousand topics (adhikaraṇas) divided into sixty quarters (pāda) forming twelve chapters. Each chapter has four quarters, but the third, the sixth and the tenth have eight each. This work with this extent is designated *dvādaśalakṣaṇī*, and is accepted by all as being the work of Jaimini. There are, however, four more chapters comprising about 600 aphorisms discussing nearly 350 topics in sixteen quarters. This portion, generally known as the *Saṅkarṣakāṇḍa*, is of a miscellaneous character, evinces some differences of style from the *Dvādaśalakṣanī* and appears to have been neglected by ancient authorities like Śabara, Kumārila and Prabhākara. This portion, considered to be of doubtful authorship till recently, has now been shown to be only a continuation of the *Dvādaśalakṣanī*; and all the sixteen chapters under the name *ṣoḍaśalakṣanî* are considered to be the work of one and the same author, Jaimini.

Dharma (defined as a sacrificial act enjoined by the Veda, conducive to the welfare of man) in its various aspects forms the subject-matter of this work as a whole.

Sacrifice is of two types : archetype (prakṛti) and ectype (vikṛti). Prakṛti is a sacrifice that is fully described in the Brāhmaṇas in all its details ; while vikṛti is that which is enjoined by the extension (atideśavākya) *prakṛtivad vikṛtiḥ kartavyā,* and only its points of difference from the prakṛti are mentioned. Things mostly concerning the former are discussed in chapters one to six, while topics concerning the latter are discussed in the next six chapters. The two sections of this work are, therefore, often referred to as the upadeśa and the atideśa ṣaṭka (hexad) respectively. The remaining four chapters are of a miscellaneous character and deal with several topics concerning sacrifice and religion (or duty) in general.

The Brāhmaṇas can be described as the bedrock of sacrificial religion. Various sacrifices in all their details originated and developed during this period. Various discussions are found in this literature regarding the details of various sacrifices. This shows that Mīmāṁsā as a Śāstra was, so to say, coming into being during that period. In fact, in one such discussion[1] we actually get the remark that here is the birth of Vicikitsā (which is the same as Mīmāṁsā). In some of these discussions we also find the roots of the adhikaraṇa or topic system, which is peculiar to the two Mīmāṁsās among the darśanas. Such discussions must have been carried on at various sacrificial sessions or on other similar occasions, and thus must have evolved the science of the accurate performance of sacrifice, on the basis of the various arguments involving problems of interpretation. Here then we have two different aspects—one concerning correct interpretation and the other pertaining to the

1 *aittirīya Brāhmaṇa,* 2.1.2

correct, continuous performance of sacrifice in all its details. The former has developed and found its culmination in the work of Jaimini, while the latter has given rise to the Śrautasūtra literature.

The Mīmāṁsā system is a natural growth and development of the Brāhmaṇa literature in one of its aspects. Before, however, the system got its culmination in the work of Jaimini, it is quite possible that several other similar attempts were made at systematising the teaching of the Brāhmaṇas. The mention of several ācāryas, Ālekhana, Kārṣṇājini, etc., by Jaimini in his work may justify this view. But none of these has come down to us.

Jaimini has defined dharma as an act or a set of acts known on the authority of the scriptural text alone (codanālakṣaṇaḥ) and is at the same time conducive to human well-being (arthaḥ).[1] This means that anything that is or can be known on the basis of any other means of knowledge (by itself or in addition to codanā) or anything that is not conducive to human well-being cannot be designated dharma. This naturally means that codanā is the pramāṇa (authority) for dharma. But this is not all. For it is further held that codanā is invariably pramāṇa, authoritative, and never otherwise. This view is based on the theory that a source of knowledge (pramāṇa) is correct and valid in and by itself unless it is proved to be otherwise. The Mīmāṁsā accordingly holds that śabda, word, (and codanā is śabda) is self-authentic (svataḥpramāṇa). Further, it has to be noted that though codanā or śabda is vākya, it is not on a par with the laukika vākya, a sentence in common parlance. For, the latter is contaminated by human contact (puruṣānupraveśa) and is thus liable to be invalid (apramāṇa) occasionally. It cannot be invariably valid. Codanā

1 *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*, 1.1.2

(Vedic sentence), on the other hand, is above all human contact; and hence there is no reason why it should ever be invalid. Hence it is invariably valid. This absence of human contact in the case of the Vedic sentence is established in the Mīmāṁsā system on the basis of the eternal nature (nityatva) of śabda, artha (of the śabda), and the relation between the two (śabdārthasambandha); and by further pointing out that vākyārtha, meaning of the sentence, is nothing but the sum total of the padārthas, meanings of the words.

Now dharma is evidently an act to be performed; and if codanā is the means of knowing dharma, it follows that codanā must be kriyārtha, a statement conveying or enjoining an action. But every statement in the Veda is not kriyārtha. It is well known that the Vedic statements fall into five classes or groups, namely, vidhi (injunction), pratiṣedha (prohibition), arthavāda (eulogy), mantra (chant), and nāmadheya (name). The last three of these are apparently not kriyārtha and hence will have to be declared to be anarthaka (futile).[1] But Jaimini has shown that they are kriyārtha, of course, indirectly and hence as valid as the vidhi and the pratiṣedha. Mantra reminds us of matters pertaining to the act (samavetārthasmāraka), arthavāda urges us to perform what is enjoined or prevents us from doing what is prohibited; and is thus connected with kriyā, through injunction or prohibition which are directly kriyārtha. Nāmadheya also can be said to be kriyārtha because it conveys to us the whole kriyā itself by naming it. It is thus clear that codanā or vedavākya in each of its variety is connected with kriyā and must as such be valid. And this is what is known as the śabdapramāṇa (or śruti as distinguished from smṛti and other means of dharmajñāna).

---

1 *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*, 1.2.1

Smṛti and śiṣṭācāra are further admitted as pramāṇas (authorities) for knowing dharma, with this difference that while śruti (or śabda) is svataḥpramāṇa (directly authoritative), smṛti and śiṣṭācāra have only indirect validity, based on śruti only. Hence it is clearly declared by Jaimini that in case of conflict with śruti, smṛti can have no validity at all. When, however, there is no such direct conflict with an extant śruti, smṛti may be considered as being based on some śruti now lost to us. It is on the basis of śruti (extant or inferred) that smṛti can claim validity and not independently by itself.[1]

Smṛtis are the codes of Manu, Gautama and other sages; śiṣṭācāra is the actual conduct of those whose lives have been disciplined by the injunctions and prohibitions of śruti and smṛti and whose conduct is thus exemplary.

Incidentally it may be observed here that Jaimini does not care to discuss in full the laukika pramāṇas, authorities in respect of worldly knowledge. In one sūtra[2] he has defined pratyakṣa just to show that it is based on actual contact between the sense-organ and the existing matter (artha, the object to be perceived) and as such cannot serve as a proper means for knowing dharma (which is not bhūta but only bhavya). This by implication means that other laukika pramāṇas such as anumāna (inference), arthāpatti (presumption), etc., based on pratyakṣa as they are, can have no capacity whatever to serve as means to the knowledge of dharma. Jaimini's reticence about these pramāṇas can be understood if we remember that he is mainly concerned with knowledge of dharma and not of ordinary things (laukika jñāna). But at the same time it may be noted that he has utilised these pramāṇas or means of knowledge also wherever there was need.

---

1 *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*, 1.3.3
2 „ 1.1.4

Having thus defined dharma and discussed the means to its knowledge, Jaimini proceeds to deal with some topics which pertain to the archetype. Thus in chapters 2-6 he has dealt with the topics of karmabheda (separateness of the act), śeṣatva (the relation of the subsidiary and the principal, aṅgāṅgibhāva), prayukti (the motive for the performance of the various acts which may be either kratvartha or puruṣārtha), krama (the order of the performance of the aṅgas), and adhikāra (qualifications) respectively. The next two chapters are devoted to atideśa (transfer of details from the archetype to the ectype) in its two varieties, namely, sāmānya (general) and viśeṣa (particular); while the last four chapters deal with ūha (modification), bādha and samuccaya (annulment of details and combination of details), tantra and āvāpa (single performance or repeated performance of a subsidiary with reference to the principal act), and finally prasaṅga and vikalpa (indirect aid by a single performance of a subsidiary and option) respectively. The four chapters of the saṅkarṣakāṇḍa discuss various other topics concerning mantra, praiṣa, nigada, vaṣaṭkāra, etc., and further deal with such materials as agni (fire), iṣṭakāḥ (bricks), yūpa (sacrificial post), etc.

After this broad statement of the contents of the work of Jaimini, we may turn to his actual teaching, which can be looked at from three points of view, namely, as a science of sacrifice, as a science of interpretation and as a system of philosophy.

As a science of sacrifice it is related to the Brāhmaṇas on the one hand and the *Kalpasūtras* on the other. As we have already seen, it systematises the teaching of the Brāhmaṇas about sacrifice as a whole ; and this it does mainly by attempting a correct interpretation of the Brāhmaṇa texts. In this respect the *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* is to

the Brāhmaṇas what the *Vedāntasūtra* is to the Upaniṣads; and that is why these works and the systems propounded by them are designated the Pūrvamīmāṁsā and the Uttaramīmāṁsā respectively.

Sacrificial acts are classified under two heads, pradhāna (principal) and aṅga (subsidiary) according as they serve to bring about the promised or the ultimate result (phala), or simply serve the purpose of the sacrifice. These two classes are known as puruṣārtha and kratvartha respectively. The ultimate result is supposed to come only out of the proper performance of the main (pradhāna) act together with all its subsidiaries (aṅga).

But since an act (karman) is only transient, it cannot last till the moment the fruit accrues to the sacrificer. From what does the result arise then and how? The Mīmāṁsaka's answer is that it springs from some unseen potency (apūrva), which the act engenders in the sacrificer before it becomes extinct.[1] All acts having no perceptible result (dṛṣṭa artha) are thus supposed to create a force called apūrva; and all the apūrvas arising out of subsidiary acts (aṅgāpūrva) combining into that of the main act, the pradhānāpūrva, ultimately yield the fruit that is to accrue from the sacrifice concerned. Therefore the mīmāṁsaka, it may be noted here, does not accept God (devatā) as the bestower of the fruit (phala). Jaimini clearly declares that devatā is only subsidiary (guṇībhūta) to sacrificial act (yajñakarma)[2].

From a different point of view acts (karman) are classified under three heads, namely, nitya (obligatory), naimittika (incidental), and kāmya (actuated by desire). Nitya acts are obligatory for all. Their non-performance entails pratyavāya. The naimittika acts are contingent

1 *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*, 2.1.5.

2 „ 9.1.9.

upon particular nimittas ; and are to be performed only as and when occasions for them arise. The kāmya acts are to be performed by one who desires to secure the results predicated of them. But some special qualifications are laid down for persons who would go in for these kāmya acts.

A kāmya act yields the desired or expected result only if it is performed in full details. The nitya acts, on the other hand, have no positive result to yield ; but their non-performance results in pratyavāya (reproach). These are, therefore, to be performed by all. The social implication of this appears to be that every member of the society owes some minimum duty to the society: and that he has to perform it to the best of his ability in spite of the handicaps that he may be labouring under. Discharge of these duties alone entitles one to live as a member of the society free from any reproach (pratyavāya). Importance of work as social duty on the one hand and as a prerequisite for benefits or emoluments on the other appears to have been duly recognised—more particularly so by relegating devatā to a subordinate position with reference to karman and thus establishing a firm and immediate or direct reciprocation between karman (duty) and phala (right).

It is this philosophy of karman that forms the main interest of the Mīmāṁsā system. In course of time, however, the philosophy of jñāna (Vedānta) appears to have gained ground ; and owing to its inherent defects, the sacrificial cult appears to have dwindled into insignificance, leading this philosophy of karman to the verge of oblivion. This setback of the mīmāṁsā appears to have been accelerated by the circumstance that in his work Jaimini has confined himself strictly to the interpretation of Brāhmaṇa texts and avoided expressing any view concerning the usual philosophical problems such as Man, God, World, and their mutual relation.

In its aspect as a science of interpretation (vākyaśāstra), the Mīmāṁsā has exercised the utmost influence in every field where interpretation has scope. Jaimini refutes the view that śabda or word is kārya (created) and hence anitya (non-eternal) ; and with further arguments concludes that it is nitya (eternal).[1] He further declares that the relation between śabda and artha (meaning) also is eternal (autpattika-nitya).[2] Similarly he holds that vākyārtha is nothing but a sum total of the padārthas, so much so that the Vaidika vākya is above all human contact, and hence above invalidity (aprāmāṇya). A vākya (sentence) is a group of words which taken together yield one complete sense, but taken separately are incapable of conveying it.[3] It is on the basis of this principle of ekavākyatā (syntactic unity) that a sentence laying down the main act (mukhya or utpatti-vidhi) combines with an arthavāda or with a sentence laying down a subsidiary (guṇavidhi) to form what is called a mahāvākya. The verb is the principal part of a sentence.

Jaimini has laid down six principles (pramāṇas) to determine the aṅgatva or the subsidiary character of a thing.[4] In the absence of aṅgatva, however, the acts have to be considered as independent of one another. This is what is known as karmabheda ; and this can be determined on the basis of another set of six principles.[5] In a sacrifice several details are to be performed ; and for this their order has to be fixed. For determining this order another set of six pramāṇas is enunciated.[6] Jaimini has also laid down other principles, e.g., anuṣaṅga, and adhyāhāra[7] for completing the apparently incomplete sentences ; and the principle of vipariṇāma (change of case, etc.) for interpreting a sentence which would other-

1 *Mīmāṁsāsūtra*, 1.1.6-23
2 „ 1.1.5
3 „ 2.1.46
„ 3.3.14
5 „ 2.2.1 ff
6 „ 5.1.1 ff
7 „ 2.1.48 f

wise be rendered futile.

On the whole, it is laid down that words in an injunction (vidhivākya) must be interpreted literally and not metaphorically ; while lakṣaṇā (metaphorical or secondary interpretation) may be resorted to in the case of arthavāda and subsidiary statements. The various senses conveyed by this lakṣaṇā have been set forth.[1] That an unqualified plural stands for number three only (kapiñjala nyāya)[2] is determined; and also points like singular includes plural and masculine includes feminine in some statements,[3] but singular stands for singular and masculine stands for masculine in other statements.[4] Rules have also been formulated for interpreting negative sentences by a proper construction of the negative particle (nañ) and thus taking the sentence as a pratiṣedha, or a vikalpa, or an arthavāda.[5]

It may be observed that these and a host of other principles of interpretation formulated or indicated by Jaimini have been utilised in the field of Dharmaśāstra to such an extent that for an accurate understanding of a Dharmaśāstra text a good acquaintance with the Mīmāṁsā rules of interpretation (the nyāyas as they are commonly called) is absolutely necessary. These rules have parallels in the modern legal interpretation. This phase of Mīmāṁsā is, therefore, of a very wide and at the same time lasting importance. As a philosophy of action (karman), reinterpreted so as to suit the changed conditions of the modern world, the Mīmāṁsā will yet be of importance and interest. The whole world stands today in need of a teaching which will make us conscious of duties (social or otherwise) and teach us to wait and let the rights come as a natural consequence of the acts performed.

---

1 *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* 1.4.23
2 „ 11.1.38 ff.
3 „ 3.1.13 ff.
4 „ 4.1.11 ff.
5 „ 10.8.1 ff.

BADARĀYAṆA

T.M.P. Mahadevan

The most pervasive philosophical tradition in India is the Vedānta in its different forms. The reason for this is that the schools of Vedānta trace their origin to the Upaniṣads which have justly been called the Himalayas of the Soul. The Upaniṣads themselves are called Vedānta, because they constitute the *end* of Veda—both in the sense of constituting, mostly, the *concluding* portions of the Veda, and of containing its *purport*. Of all the orthodox systems (āstika-darśana), it is Pūrvamīmāṁsā and Vedānta that are most orthodox because of their close adherence, respectively, to the ritual sections (karmakāṇḍa) and philosophical sections (jñānakāṇḍa) of the Veda. The philosophical sections are the Upaniṣads. The Vedāntic schools are founded on them.

For every system of philosophy there is a basic sūtra work. The purpose of a sūtra is to string together the leading ideas of a particular system in an intelligible and ordered manner. The sūtra for Vedānta was the work of Bādarāyaṇa whom Indian tradition identifies with Vyāsa. For information regarding Bādarāyaṇa-Vyāsa we have to depend mostly on tradition. 'Vyāsa' would seem to be a generic title, meaning an 'arranger' or 'compiler'. In every Dvāpara age Viṣṇu is said to appear as Vyāsa and classify the Veda into different sections. He is, therefore, known as Veda-Vyāsa. The Vyāsa of the present cycle is Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana, born of Parāśara and Satyavatī. In his previous birth, he was the sage Apāntaratamas. A verse in the *Bhāmatī* describes him as the incarnation of Viṣṇu's

cognitive energy (jñānaśakti-avatāra). He is called Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana because he was dark in colour and was born in an island. As he dwelt for a long time in Badarikāśrama, performing tapas, he is known as Bādarāyaṇa. He is counted among the long-lived ones (cirajīvins), the others of this class being Aśvatthāmā, Bali, Hanumāna, Vibhīṣaṇa, Kṛpa and Paraśurāma.

Tradition has it that Vyāsa classified the Veda into four sections, viz., *Ṛg*, *Yajus*, *Sāma* and *Atharva*, and taught them to four disciples, Paila, Vaiśaṁpāyana, Jaimini and Sumantu respectively. "In the yuga that is to commence, i. e., Kali," so Vyāsa must have thought, "the life-span of people will be short; their memory-power will be weak; the super-normal powers of yoga will decrease; something should be done in order to save the Veda from utter destruction."[1] Hence he classified the Veda into four and taught one of them to one disciple, thereby facilitating its preservation. Besides the classification of the Veda, Vyāsa is credited with the authorship of the Epic *Mahābhārata*, and of the eighteen Mahāpurāṇas. The importance of the *Mahābhārata* may be realised from the fact that it is reckoned as the fifth Veda, the Veda of Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana (*pañcamo vedaḥ*, *kārṣṇa veda*). There are sections of the *Mahābhārata* which have high philosophical value. The *Bhagavadgītā*, its crest-jewel, is one of the canons of Vedānta. The Purāṇas were composed by Vyāsa in order to convey the highest truth in an easy and simple manner through stories and legends. If the teaching of the Veda is like the command of a master (prabhusammita), that of the Purāṇas, it is said, is like the counsel of a friend (suhṛtsammita).

1 See *Veda-Vyāsa* by H.H. Sri Sankaracharya of Kanchi, *Kamakoti Vani* (Machilipatnam), Vol. I. No. 8. (1969), p. 9

The Epics and the Purāṇas are, as it were, popular commentaries on the Veda and the Vedānta. They help in one's understanding of the purport of the Veda.

We shall now turn to an analysis of the *Vedāntasūtra* which is a foundational text for Vedānta. The other two basic texts are the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavadgītā*. Together they are known as the prasthāna-traya, triple canon of Vedānta. The Upaniṣads constitute the revealed texts (śrutiprasthāna). The *Bhagavadgītā* which is a part of a smṛti (i. e., the *Mahābhārata*) is smṛtiprasthāna. The *Vedāntasūtra* is regarded as nyāyaprasthāna, since it sets forth the teachings of Vedānta in logical order. This work has other names also : *Brahmasūtra*, because its theme is Brahman; *Śārīrakasūtra*, because it is concerned with the embodied soul; *Bhikṣusūtra*, because those who are competent to study it are the sannyāsins; *Uttaramīmāṁsāsūtra*, because it is an inquiry into the final sections of the Veda. The *Vedāntasūtra* is in four chapters (adhyāyas); each chapter is divided into four parts (pādas); each part has a number of sections (adhikaraṇas); and each section has one or more aphorisms (sūtras). According to Śaṅkara, the number of sections is 192. The total number of aphorisms is 555.

The four chapters are devoted, respectively, to harmony (samanvaya), non-conflict (avirodha), means (sādhana) and fruit (phala). In the first chapter, Bādarāyaṇa teaches that the Vedāntic texts, considered in their harmony, have for their purport Brahman, the non-dual reality. The texts which expressly mention Brahman or Ātman do not present any difficulty. But there are several Upaniṣadic passages where other terms are used which do not normally mean Brahman-Ātman. The context, however, in which these names occur would make it evident that the reference is to the supreme Self. For

instance, 'Ākāśa' means the supreme Self, and not the elemental ether; for, all beings are stated to come out of it and get resolved into it. Thus Ākāśa in the sense of the world-ground can mean only Brahman.[1] Similarly, the term Prāṇa in the *Chāndogya* text,[2] "Which is that deity? He said: Prāṇa", means not the vital air but Brahman, because all beings are said to merge in it.[3] The same is the case with the term Manas or Manomaya in another text of the same Upaniṣad;[4] for, here the commencing statement is "All this, indeed, is Brahman", and also the Manomaya figures as the object of meditation. This can only be Brahman, and not the individual soul.[5] In all such instances, what determines the meaning of a term is not the ordinary usage, but the context[6] and the construed meaning of the related texts.[7] The reality that is described under such names is the source of the universe, endowed with the characteristics that are assigned to Brahman; it is existence-consciousness-bliss; it is the object of meditation; it is the goal that is realised by the released souls (*muktopasṛpya*).[8]

A rival view in regard to the ground or source of the universe is that of Sāṁkhya, according to which prakṛti or pradhāna (primal nature) is the prius of evolution. Bādarāyaṇa argues against this view at some length in the first chapter. The main argument is that the Sāṁkhya view is not in accordance with the teachings of the Upaniṣads. Pradhāna is sought to be established on the strength of inference (*ānumānikam*),[9] and is not what is taught in scripture (*aśabdam*).[10] The terms such as avyakta and mahat occurring in the Upaniṣads do not refer to the Sāṁkhya categories. Even the ajā of the

1 *Vedāntasūtra*, 1. 1. 22
2 1. 11. 4-5
3 *Vedāntasūtra*, 1. 1. 23
4 3. 14. 1-2
5 *Vedāntasūtra*, 1. 2. 1
6 *Ibid.*, 1. 2. 10: *prakaraṇācca*
7 „ 1. 4. 19: *vākyānvayāt*
8 „ 1. 3. 2
9 „ 1. 4. 1
10 „ 1. 1. 5

Śvetaśvatara Upaniṣad, with its three colours, red, white and black, does not signify the prakṛti of the Sāṁkhya. Since the world-cause, according to scripture, is intelligent, pradhāna cannot be the cause;[1] also, the cause is referred to as the self,[2] and one who is devoted to it is said to gain release.[3] Pradhāna is what is to be abandoned, whereas the world-cause, according to the Upaniṣads, is what is to be gained.[4]

Thus in the first chapter Bādarāyaṇa endeavours to show that the cumulative teaching of the Upaniṣads is that the supreme reality is Brahman-Ātman, that this is the ground of the universe, and that the views which ascribe the causality of the world to what is other than Brahman, such as pradhāna, are not sound.

The second chapter, as we have noted, has for its theme 'non-conflict' (avirodha). Bādarāyaṇa here discusses the various objections that may be raised against the view of Vedānta, and refutes them. The main opponent in this chapter, as in the previous one, is the Sāṁkhya. The Sāṁkhya philosopher is the principal opponent because his view is the least objectionable. And, if this standpoint is shown to be untenable, then the other views would fall easily. For instance, the Yoga view, it is said, stands refuted, when the Sāṁkhya has been shown to be unsound.[5] The same fate attends on all the views that are not accepted by the wise.[6] Meeting the Sāṁkhya school on its own ground, it is shown that even reasoning is not in favour of the doctrine that pradhāna is the cause of evolution. There is observed design in the world, But pradhāna which is inert cannot be credited with any design, or even with the will to

1 *Vedāntasūtra*, 1. 1. 5
2 „ 1. 1. 6
3 „ 1. 1. 7
4 „ 1. 1. 8
5 „ 2. 1. 3
6 „ 2. 1. 12

create. Its starting to function or ceasing to function cannot be explained. Nor can the evolution from pradhāna have any intelligible purpose.[1] The Vaiśeṣika seeks to account for creation in terms of atoms and adṛṣṭa (unseen potency). This view also does not bear scrutiny. Whether the unseen potency be taken as inhering in the atoms or in the souls, the movement of the atoms becomes unintelligible; and if only the atoms moved, the things constituting the world would be formed. The unseen potency, like the atoms, is non-intelligent; how can it impart drive to the atoms ? Moreover, the category of inherence itself is fraught with insuperable difficulties, as it leads to infinite regress. There are also other defects in the atomic theory. The atoms are stated to possess colour, etc. If this be so, they could be neither partless nor eternal. And, from the partless atoms, how can things with parts arise ?[2] The Bauddha Realist recognises two kinds of aggregates, the internal and the external, as constituting the world. But he cannot explain how aggregation takes place, with his commitment to the doctrine of momentariness. According to the Bauddha there is a causal chain governing the empirical process. Even granting that there is connection between what precedes and what succeeds, it is not explained by him how the aggregation as a whole takes place. And, the successive moments, in the so-called causal chain cannot be related as causes and effects even because of their momentariness.[3] The Bauddha Idealist holds that there is no extra-mental reality, cognitions alone being real. But his view is not sound because the external things that are experienced cannot be denied. In the absence of external things how can residual impressions (saṁskāra) arise, and how can the appearance

1 *Vedāntasūtra* 2. 2. 1-6
2 „ 2, 2. 11-17
3 „ 2. 2. 18ff

of things be accounted for in terms of those residual impressions? The Idealist who also subscribes to the doctrine of momentariness suffers from the difficulties presented by this doctrine. Thus, says Bādarāyaṇa, the Bauddha view is totally unintelligible (*Sarvathānupapatteḥ ca*).[1] The Jaina believes in both permanence and change, identity and difference. But, how could one and the same thing possess contradictory attributes? The Jaina attributes size to the soul. This too is unintelligible because anything that has size would be material, and not spiritual. There are other inconsistencies also. And so, the doctrines of Jainism cannot be accepted.[2]

The Vedānta view is, as we have seen, that Brahman is the ultimate reality, the world-ground. Some theistic schools consider God to be the efficient cause alone. But that is not sound, because God would then become limited and finite.[3] It is from God that all things, physical as well as psychical, come into existence. Ether, etc., the sense-organs, and the vital airs—all appear out of Brahman. Creation does not involve effort on the part of Brahman. The so-called creative activity is comparable to sport.[4] Even as milk turns into curds without any external agency, Brahman appears as the world without the help of external accessories.[5] Creation is not production *de novo* . The non-evolution and evolution of the world are like the folded and spread out conditions, respectively, of a piece of cloth.[6] In fact, the world is not separate from Brahman; it is not another. The effect is non-different from the cause. In other words, the cause alone is real. There is no real modification for Brahman.[7]

If the world is an apparent modification of Brahman,

1 *Vedāntasūtra*, 2. 2. 32
2 ,, 2. 2. 33ff.
3 ,, 2. 2. 37
4 ,, 2. 1. 33
5 ,, 2. 1. 24
6 ,, 2. 1. 19
7 ,, 2. 1. 14

what is the relation of the individual soul (jīva) to Brahman ? Is it also a product, a modification ? The Pāñcarātra view is that the soul is produced from God; from Vāsudeva is born Saṅkarṣaṇa. Bādarāyaṇa rejects this view. Origination is impossible for the soul.[1] The soul is related to Brahman as reflection to prototype.[2] It is this which acts, enjoys, transmigrates, strives for release and gains it.

The third chapter of the *Vedāntasūtra* is concerned with *sādhana*, the means to release. It first discusses the alternative paths along which the soul may travel after physical death. The Cārvāka view that there is no soul apart from the body is not sound, because a dead body is not seen to possess consciousness.[3] After the decease of the present body, the soul may go along either the path of the gods (devayāna) or the path of the fathers (pitṛyāna). As it migrates, the soul carries with it the subtle parts of the elements and the sense-organs, etc., that had been with it. Through the appropriate meditations performed in this life, the soul goes to Brahma-loka along the path of the gods; and through the performance of sacrifice, it goes to the land of the fathers. There is also a third place mentioned in the scriptures; these souls which do not go along either of the two paths referred to become those tiny, continually revolving creatures of which it may be said, "Be born and die."[4] Even the souls that go to the world of the gods have to return to this world on the exhaustion of their merit.[5] Heaven is not the goal; it is but a temporary holiday resort. Similarly, those souls which go to the nether worlds will also have to return after the fruits of their evil deeds have been

1 *Vedāntasūtra*, 2. 2. 42
2 „ 2. 3, 50
3 „ 3. 3. 53-54
4 „ 3. 1. 17
5 „ 3. 1. 8

accounted for. The texts say by what process the soul descends to the earth, how it enters the womb, and how it gathers unto itself a fresh body. Even in one and the same life, the soul passes through different states of experience, waking, dream and deep sleep. It is the same soul that persists in and through these changing states. Its migration will cease only when it realises the non-dual Brahman.

Brahman in itself is attributeless, formless (*arūpavad-eva hi, tatpradhānatvāt*).[1] There are scriptural texts in which, it is true, attributes are ascribed to Brahman. This ascription, however, is for the sake of upāsanā, (meditation). Even as light which has no form appears to take on the forms of the objects which it illuminates, Brahman which is formless appears as if endowed with form on account of adjuncts.[2] Brahman is pure consciousness; its forms are like the reflections of the one sun in reservoirs of water.[3] It is because Brahman in itself is unconditioned that scripture indicates its nature *via negativa* as "not thus, not thus", and says that it is not what is manifest.[4]

When the soul is rid of its ignorance, it realises its non-difference from the infinite Brahman.[5] This is evident from the fact that scripture denies difference (*pratiṣedhāc-ca*).[6] It is for the sake of facilitating the realisation of non-difference that the various modes of meditation called vidyās are taught in scripture. The vidyās, although various, have one and the same purpose.[7] The identity of a vidyā, its nature and mode, should be determined from the context in which it is taught. In two different Upaniṣadic texts, for instance, the name of the vidyā may be the same, but they may be two different

1 *Vedāntasūtra*, 3.2.14
2 „ 3.2, 15
3 „ 3.2.18
4 „ 3.2.22-23
5 „ 3.2.26
6 „ 3.2.30
7 „ 3.3.1

meditations. In some cases the name may differ, but if the content is identical, the meditation taught is one and the same. Some details of a vidyā may be given in one place and other details in another place; then what the sādhaka should do is to combine all these in his meditation. One may practise any of the vidyās; it is not necessary that one should perform all the vidyās, which is not possible either. Performance of any vidyā leads to the same goal.[1] Since the vidyās are meditations on Saguṇa Brahman, the one who follows this discipline goes, after death, along the path of the gods.[2] The knower of Nirguṇa Brahman does not go along any path because he attains Brahman here itself.

Sannyāsa is the fourth āśrama prescribed, even as the other āśramas are. It is the sannyāsins that have the eligibility for knowledge. They have no need to perform ritual. The injunction for tending the sacred fires, etc., does not apply to them.[3] The performance of rituals is enjoined only on those who have studied the Veda and know about the sacrifices mentioned therein and are entitled to the path of works.[4] It is not that the performance of duties has no use. Works are useful as indirect means, since they serve to purify the mind. The seeker after knowledge should cultivate such virtues as calmness, self-control, etc., as these serve as help to knowledge.[5] He who follows the path of knowledge gains the human goal which is mokṣa.[6] The goal can be reached in this very life. What is required is the removal of obstacles that bar the way.[7] There are no grades of, or differences in mukti; for, what is called the state of release is nothing but Brahman.[8]

1 *Vedāntasūtra*, 3.3.59
2 „ 3.3.29
3 „ 3.4.25
„ 3.4.12
5 „ 3.4.27
6 „ 3.4.1
7 „ 3.4.51
8 „ 3.4.52

The last chapter is phala-adhyāya; it discusses mainly the fruit of Brahman-knowledge, and also, incidentally, some of the auxiliary matters. The worshipper of Saguṇa Brahman, as we have seen, goes along the path of the gods. The various stages in this journey are described in the texts. As the soul leaves the physical body, it takes along with it the subtle body which lasts till the time of release.[1] The soul of the knower of Saguṇa Brahman reaches the region of the heart and then departs through the *suṣumṇānāḍī*.[2] The soul, thereafter, follows the rays of the sun and goes to Brahmaloka.[3] During the course of the journey, various deities take charge of it; they conduct it along the path of the gods. After reaching Brahmaloka, the soul stays there as identified with Saguṇa Brahman. And, when that loka is destroyed, the soul realises Nirguṇa Brahman.[4] In the last chapter it was taught that release is gained even in this life by one who realises Nirguṇa Brahman. When the physical body of such a one falls, there is no further journey for his soul. His prāṇas do not depart; they get resolved even here[5]; Brahman-realisation frees one from all sin.[6] The body of the jīvanmukta continues till the prārabdha (karma which has begun to fructify and is responsible for the present body) lasts. The knower of Brahman attains absolute non-difference with Brahman, avibhāgaḥ.[7] When one gains release, there is no more return to the empirical cycle of birth and death (*anāvṛttiḥ*).[8]

In the *Vedāntasūtra*, thus, we have a systematic conspectus of the teaching of Vedānta. There must have been

---

1 *Vedāntasūtra*, 4.2.8
2 „ 4.2.17
3 „ 4.2.18
4 „ 4.3.10
5 „ 4.2.12
6 „ 4.1.13
7 „ 4.2.16
8 „ 4.4 22

exponents of Vedānta before Bādarāyaṇa; but their works have not come down to us. Bādarāyaṇa refers to some of them by name. Āśmarathya seems to have been a bhedābhedavādin advocating both difference and non-difference as between the individual soul and the supreme Self. It is in the light of this view that he interprets the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text[1] which says that "all this becomes known when the self is known"[2]. In the discussion about the Vaiśvānara, the question is : how does the attribution of spatial limitation stand to reason, if the expression meant Brahman, and not the gastric fire ? Āśmarathya says that spatial limitation is for the sake of Brahman's manifestation out of favour for the worshipper[3]. Auḍulomi too is stated to hold a kind of bhedābheda view. According to him, the soul gets identified with the supreme self only after its departure from the body. In the state of ignorance there is real difference between the two; in the state of release there is non-difference. The non-difference is to be achieved through the practice of knowledge, meditation, concentration, etc.[4] What is the state of the liberated soul ? Does it acquire characteristics such as freedom from sin, etc.? Does anything new happen to it ? Auḍulomi answers in the negative. The soul's essential nature is consciousness. The liberated soul is established in its real nature which is consciousness.[5] There are certain meditations prescribed in connection with rites. Who is to perform them : the sacrificer or the priest? The view of Auḍulomi is that it is the duty of the priest, since he is paid for it.[6] The view of Ātreya, on the contrary, is that it is the sacrificer who should perform the medita-

---

1 4.5.6
2 *Vedāntasūtra*, 1.4.20
3 „ 1.2.29
4 „ 1.4.21
5 „ 4.4.6
6 „ 3.4.45

tions, because the texts mention the results of the meditations for the sacrificer.[1] The soul, after death, goes to heaven if it has to its credit good work and enjoys there. On the exhaustion of merit, it descends to the earth. But, what is it that makes the soul descend ? It is residual karma, says Kārṣṇājini. And, this is intelligible. It is only such good work whose fruit is heaven that is exhausted through life in the world. Since there is yet residual karma, the soul has to come back to this world. In the *Chāndogya* text[2] the word caraṇa meaning 'conduct' is used. But its signification must be understood by implication as 'remaining karma'.[3] Bādari takes the word caraṇa to mean good and bad works themselves and he believes that, even taken to mean thus, the word indicates residual karma, since conduct and karma are not different.[4] In regard to the ascription of spatial limitation to Brahman, Bādari's view is that this is because Brahman is meditated on by the mind as inhabiting the heart which is spatially limited.[5] The meditator who after death goes along the path of the gods attains, according to Bādari, the Saguṇa Brahman; for it is only with reference to it, and not with reference to Nirguṇa Brahman, expressions such as 'going', attaining', etc., are meaningful.[6] To the question whether the souls, that have reached Brahma-loka possess bodies and sense-organs, Bādari says 'no', on the strength of the relevant Upaniṣadic texts.[7] The name of Kāśakṛtsna occurs only once. The view of this sage is cited in connection with the discussion of the relation between the individual soul and the supreme Self. According to Kāśakṛtsna, there is no difference at all between the two. It is Brahman that appears as the individual soul ; Brahman exists as the soul.[8]

1 *Vedāntasūtra*, 3. 4. 44
2 „ 5.10.7
3 *Vedāntasūtra*, 3.1.9
4 „ 3.1.11
5 „ 1.2.30
6 „ 4.3.7
7 „ 4.4.10
8 „ 1.4.22

Bādarāyaṇa mentions the name of Jaimini eleven times in as many aphorisms, and refers to the *Pūrvamīmāṁsā-sūtras* in a few other aphorisms without mentioning Jaimini's name. Here, Jaimini appears as a teacher of both Vedānta and Mīmāṁsā. Regarding the term Vaiśvānara, Jaimini is of the view that it may be taken as referring directly to Brahman: the term means 'universal Puruṣa'.[1] The spatial limitation of Brahman is for the sake of meditation based on superimposition.[2] Are beings above man, such as the gods, eligible for upāsanā (meditation) and knowledge of Brahman ? Jaimini thinks they are not. He illustrates this by citing the instance of madhu-vidyā. According to the *Chāndogya* text,[3] "this sun is *madhu* (honey) to the gods". Here human beings are to meditate on the sun by superimposing the idea of honey on it. So, meditation is prescribed for human beings, and not for the gods.[4] In the *Kauṣītakī Upaniṣad* there is a text[5] which reads thus: "He of whom this is surely the work." Who is it that is referred to here ? Is it the individual soul, or the principal vital force, or the supreme Self? According to Jaimini, the reference is to the individual soul, but meant for the purpose of the comprehension of Brahman.[6] One of the disputed questions is whether karma yields its fruit by itself, or as directed by the Lord ? Jaimini holds that dharma, religious duty, yields its fruit by itself, and claims the authority of scripture for saying so.[7] Does self-knowledge lead to the ultimate human goal ? Jaimini's view is that it has no independent value. The self is supplementary to sacrificial acts as agent. And so, when the fruit of the knowledge of self is mentioned, it is as mere praise of the

1 *Vedāntasūtra*, 1.2.28
2 ,, 1. 2. 31
3 3.1.1
4 *Vedāntasūtra*, 1.3.31
5 4.19
6 *Vedāntasūtra*, 1.4.18
7 ,, 3.2.40

agent.[1] There are texts of the Upaniṣads which speak of sannyāsa-āśrama. For example, the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* declares: "Desiring this world (*i.e.* the Self) alone monks renounce their homes."[2] Jaimini contends that this is only an allusion to sannyāsa and not an injunction. According to him, scripture does not commend sannyāsa; it condemns it.[3] Can one who has embraced sannyāsa revert back to the previous stage in life? On this question, Jaimini agrees with the Vedānta view that no reversion is permissible.[4] Is it the conditioned Brahman or the supreme Brahman that is reached by the souls that go along the path of the gods ? Jaimini thinks that it is the supreme Brahman that is reached, for this is what the word Brahman refers to in the *Chāndogya* text,[5] "He escorts them to Brahman."[6] The liberated soul, according to Jaimini, is established in the attributes belonging to Brahman, *i.e.* it gets established in its own form, and not in any adventitious form.[7] As regards the question whether the released soul possesses body and sense organs or not, Jaimini holds a view which is opposed to that of Bādari. He believes that the soul that has been released possesses body and sense organs because scripture declares that such a soul has the ability to assume diverse forms.[8]

In some of the aphorisms, Bādarāyaṇa mentions his own name, and refers to his own views in the third person. These are the views referred to: (i) Beings above human beings are also entitled to study the Veda and gain knowledge of Brahman.[9] (ii) The gods have the necessary qualification for Brahman-knowledge because they too possess the auxiliary causes such as body, desire, etc.[10] (iii)

1 *Vedāntasūtra*, 3. 4. 2
2 4. 4. 22
3 *Vedāntasūtra*, 3. 4. 18
4 „ 3.4. 40
4.15.6
6 *Vedāntasūtra*, 4. 3. 12
7 „ 4. 4. 5
8 „ 4,4,11
9 „ 1. 2. 26
10 „ 1.3.33

The fruits of actions are bestowed on the agent by the Lord. Neither action nor unseen potency (apūrva) is capable of bestowing on the agent the results, because they are insentient. They need to be guided by God.[1] (iv) The fruit of Brahman-knowledge is release, the final human end (puruṣārtha). This knowledge is not a part of ritual, for it has an independent fruit, and is taught in a context which is different from that of ritual.[2] (v) The supreme Self is over and above the agent-self. It is the knowledge of the supreme Self that is taught in Vedānta as the liberating knowledge.[3] (vi) Scripture not merely alludes to sannyāsa; it enjoins this āśrama as it does in the case of the other āśramas. Sannyāsa is taught as that which is to be observed (anuṣṭheya). If scripture enjoins the other āśramas, it prescribes the fourth āśrama too.[4] (vii) Meditation may be performed either with symbols or without symbols. Those who meditate on Saguṇa Brahman without symbols are superior. It is these that are led to Brahmaloka.[5] (viii) Agreeing with Auḍulomi that the liberated soul exists as pure intelligence, Bādarāyaṇa says that this view will not be contradicted if Jaimini's view is also accepted—the view that the liberated soul is established in the attributes belonging to Brahman.[6] (ix) In the same spirit of reconciliation, Bādarāyaṇa says in regard to the question of the liberated soul *vis-a-vis* possessing of a body, that if it wishes it may take on a body, and if it does so wish, it may remain without a body.[7]

The *Vedāntasūtra*, as we saw, consists of 555 aphorisms. The first four—referred to as Catussūtrī—are the most important, as they together indicate the substance of the entire teaching.

---

1 *Vedāntasūtra*, 3. 2. 41
2 ,, 3. 4, 1
3 ,, 3. 4. 8
4 ,, 3. 4. 19
5 ,, 4.3.15
6 ,, 4.4.7
7 ,, 4.4.12

In the first aphorism, the theme of Vedānta is set forth as the inquiry into Brahman. The eligibility for this inquiry is implicitly stated, as also the reason for undertaking the inquiry.

athāto brahma-jijñāsā. (Then, therefore, the desire to know Brahman).

The second aphorism defines Brahman as the ground of the world. The world has its origin, stay, and dissolution in Brahman.

janmādy-asya yataḥ. (That, whence, for this, there is origination, etc.).

The third aphorism carries a double meaning: Brahman is the source for the promulgation of scripture; scripture is the source for the knowledge of Brahman.

śāstra-yonitvāt. (Because of being the scripture-source).

In the fourth aphorism the reference is to the fact that the Vedāntic texts harmoniously teach Brahman as the ultimate reality.

tat tu samanvayāt: (But that, because of the harmony). No other basic text has been commented on so profusely and from so many divergent points of view as the *Vedāntasūtra.* There must have been commentaries on this work before Śaṅkara. But Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* is the earliest extant commentary that has come down to us. In the long list of commentators who came after Śaṅkara, we find the names of Bhāskara, Yādavaprakāśa, Rāmānuja, Keśava, Nīlakaṇṭha, Madhva, Baladeva, Vallabha, and Vijñānabhikṣu. The commentaries of many of these have sub-commentaries and glosses. In the Śāṅkara tradition itself there are a number of commentaries. On Śaṅkara's *bhāsya* Vācaspati wrote the *Bhāmatī*, which was followed by the *Kalpataru*, and the *Parimala.* Similarly, Padmapāda wrote the *Pañcapādikā* on Śaṅkara's

bhāṣya; and this was followed by the *vivaraṇa* and the *tattvadīpana*. These are but a few of the expositions of the *Vedāntasūtra*, and are indicative of the greatness of Bādarāyaṇa as the teacher *par excellence* of Vedānta.